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DRUGS, PATENTS, AND WELL-BEING
Christopher Buccafusco†
&
Jonathan S. Masur‡

Abstract
The ultimate end of patent law must be to spur innovations that improve
human welfare—innovations that make people better off. But firms will
only invest resources in developing patentable inventions that will allow
them to make money—that is, inventions that people will want to use and
buy. This can gravely distort the types of incentives that firms face and
the types of inventions they pursue. Nowhere is this truer than in the
pharmaceutical field. There is by now substantial evidence that treatments
for diseases that primarily afflict poorer people—including the citizens of
developing nations—are dramatically under-produced, compared with
drugs that treat diseases that afflict the wealthy. In addition, the
pharmaceutical markets are rife with “me too” drugs—drugs that treat
diseases or conditions for which successful medications already exist.
This state of affairs is not inevitable. In recent years, medical and
psychological research on well-being has created the capacity for
policymakers to draw direct links between patents and human welfare.
Armed with this information, policymakers have, for the first time, the
power to use the patent system to directly incentivize welfare-enhancing
innovations. In this Article, we propose a system of extended patent terms
for drug inventions that have a substantial impact on human welfare. We
further propose that policymakers lift many of the legal protections for
patents that have an insubstantial effect on human welfare—which we
term “futility patents”—making those patents easier to challenge and
invalidate. The result would be a reorientation of pharmaceutical firm
incentives toward drugs that will have a significant impact on welfare,
particularly for poorer and underserved populations, and away from drugs
that are profitable but do little to improve human life.
† Professor of Law, Director of the Intellectual Property Program, and Associate Dean for
Faculty Development, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the purpose of patent law? The conventional understanding of
patents is that they exist to promote innovation—or, as it says in Article I, Section
8 of the US Constitution, to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 1
But innovation is not good in and of itself. A society that innovated only more and
better ways to torment itself2 would not be doing well. Rather, the ultimate end of
patent law must be to spur innovations that improve human welfare—innovations
that make people better off. To accomplish this, patent law is parasitic on the
marketplace. Patents entitle their owners to exclude competitors from making,
using, or selling the patented invention for a limited time. 3 In effect, patents create
legal quasi-monopolies: if only the patent owner can sell the patented invention,
then the patent owner can charge (higher) monopoly prices and earn greater profits.
It is this promise of greater profits that should spur innovation. 4
Because patent law relies on the market—and the possibility of monopoly
profits—it necessarily incorporates all of the strengths—but importantly, all of the
many shortcomings—of market behavior.5 Most notably, patent law relies on
individual consumers to decide which inventions are valuable and which are not.
Firms will only invest resources in developing inventions that will allow them to
make money—that is, inventions that people will want to use and buy. The fact
that people are excited to purchase an invention, even at monopoly prices, is usually
taken to be a powerful signal that the invention is valuable and will increase human
welfare. If not, why would people pay for it?6
But markets are hardly infallible. The fact that an innovation is beneficial
for human welfare does not mean that it will be profitable, if the people whose
welfare it will increase cannot afford it. This means that innovations that primarily
serve poorer people will be underproduced.7 In addition, sometimes it is possible
to capture substantial market share with an invention that is only slightly better (or
even no better) than the inventions that preceded it. This means that firms have
significant incentives to play a version of follow-the-leader: if Firm A has created
an invention that is selling well, Firm B can make money by creating a similar
invention and siphoning off some of Firm A’s customers, even if Firm B’s
U.S. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 8.
See, e.g., Facebook, www.facebook.com; Twitter, www.twitter.com.
3 35 U.S.C. § 271 (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
4 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 20 (2003).
5 Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122
YALE L.J. 1900, 1927 (2013).
6 For further discussion, see infra notes 41-45.
7 Jean O. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals in Poor Countries,
3 INNOVATION POL’Y. & ECON. 91 (2003).
1
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invention represents, at most, a marginal improvement on Firm A’s invention. 8
Patent law’s reliance on markets can thus drive firms to invent products that they
know will sell well, rather than products that might have a much greater impact on
welfare.
These concerns are present across a wide range of technological areas, but
perhaps nowhere more so than in the area of pharmaceuticals. There is by now
substantial evidence that treatments for diseases that primarily afflict poorer
people—including the citizens of developing nations—are dramatically
underproduced, compared with drugs that treat diseases that afflict the wealthy. 9 In
addition, the pharmaceutical markets are rife with “me too” drugs—drugs that treat
diseases or conditions for which successful medications already exist. 10 A “me too”
drug that taps into a large consumer market can be very profitable even if it offers
small or zero (or negative) benefits compared with the drugs that preceded it. And
these drugs, which contribute little or nothing to human welfare, can absorb scarce
research and development funds from pharmaceutical firms and crowd out
investment in drugs that might do much more good.
Policymakers have largely treated these shortfalls as if they are
unavoidable, the necessary consequences of patent law’s slavish devotion to the
market. The problem has been thought to be one of measurement. 11 How could
policymakers know which drugs are most valuable to welfare—and thus most
deserving of encouragement and incentives—without a signal from the market? Put
another way: if the entire point of patent law is to rely on the market to determine
which inventions are valuable, it is no wonder that policymakers seem to be at a
loss when the market turns unreliable.
But policymakers no longer need feel so constrained. In recent years,
medical and psychological research on well-being has revealed new ways of
understanding and measuring human welfare, to the point that policymakers can
now estimate with substantial accuracy how much a given disease or condition
diminishes welfare, and how much a particular drug treatment improves it. The
most promising approach involves the science of hedonic psychology, through
which researchers have been able to determine close proxies for welfare. 12 Hedonic
See infra notes 69-71.
Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing Global Health
Inequalities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1031 (2005).
10 Brita Petarsky, Should Financial Incentives be Used to Differentially Reward ‘Me-Too’ and
Innovative Drugs?, 28 PHARMACOECONOMICS 1 (2010).
11 See infra notes 49-58.
12 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, EDWARD DIENER & NORBERT SCHWARZ, EDS., WELL-BEING:
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (1999). Our work joins a growing cohort of legal scholars
who are interested in applying the insights of hedonic psychology to legal problems. See e.g JOHN
BRONSTEEN, CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO & JONATHAN S. MASUR, HAPPINESS AND THE LAW
(2014); ERIC A. POSNER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAW AND HAPPINESS (2010); MATTHEW ADLER &
MICHAEL FLEURBAY, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (2016); David
Fagundes, Buying Happiness: Property, Acquisition, and Subjective Well-Being, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1851 (2017); Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241 (2013).
8
9
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psychology is in its relative infancy, but there is an alternative as well: the medical
concept of Quality-Adjusted Life Years (“QALYs”), which provide a reasonable
measure of the length and quality of an individual’s life. 13
These tools permit policymakers to draw direct links, for the first time,
between patents and human welfare. These types of connections are generally
impossible for many types of inventions, such as consumer electronics. It is difficult
to determine the welfare impact of a new iPhone, and any given electronic device
likely incorporates thousands of patents, which makes it hard to isolate the welfare
effect of any given patent. But these sorts of connections are entirely possible for
one class of invention: pharmaceuticals. First, the new research tools described in
the preceding paragraph have made it possible to reliably measure the welfare
impacts of diseases and their treatments. And second, each drug is typically linked
to one central patent on the active molecule itself. 14
Armed with this sort of information, policymakers have the power to use
the patent system in ways heretofore unimaginable, to directly incentivize welfareenhancing innovations without needing to rely upon the market to get those
incentives right. In this Article, we design and describe precisely this type of
system of patent-based incentives. 15 We propose that policymakers grant extended
patent terms to drug inventions that have a substantial impact on human welfare, as
measured using QALYs or hedonic psychology.16 We further propose that
policymakers lift many of the legal protections for patents that have an insubstantial
effect on human welfare—which we term “futility patents”—making those patents
easier to challenge and invalidate. The worst patents, those that offer zero or even
negative contributions to social welfare, should be invalidated outright. The result
would be a reorientation of pharmaceutical firm incentives: firms would have much
greater incentives to pursue drugs that benefit poorer populations, because they
could receive extended patent terms for those drugs. And they would have much
weaker incentives to pursue “me too” drugs and other medications that might be
profitable but have minimal effects on welfare. All told, our proposal offers the
possibility of ameliorating the inadequacies and inefficiencies of the market for
pharmaceutical drugs, a problem that has vexed policymakers for decades.
Our Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the manner in which
patents are meant to promote welfare, and the ways in which systemic failures in
the market for pharmaceutical drugs can cause them to fall short. Part II shows
how policymakers can draw direct connections between drug patents and human
welfare using hedonic psychology and QALYs. Part III describes and analyzes our
proposal for heightened patent incentives for welfare-enhancing patents and
Graham Loomes & Lynda McKenzie, The Use of QALYs in Health Care Decision Making, 28
SOC. SCI. & MED. 299 (1989),
14 See infra notes 117-119.
15 See infra Part III.
16 Neel Sukhatme and Gregg Bloche independently published a similar proposal while our
manuscript was in progress. See Neel U. Sukhatme & M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care Costs and the
Arc of Innovation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 955 (2019). Although complementary, our proposal differs
from their in a number of ways. See infra note 224 for further details.
13
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diminished incentives for “futile” patents. In Part IV, we respond to some potential
objections and demonstrate that our proposal is resilient to a variety of potential
concerns.
Patent law has been tethered to the marketplace for too long, to deleterious
effect. We propose to decouple it, to the benefit of patients, drug companies, and
society as a whole.

I. PATENTS, MARKETS, AND WELL-BEING
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to grant patents to
inventors in order “to promote the progress of…the useful arts.” 17 Most courts and
scholars understand this language to create a consequentialist foundation for patent
law that encourages Congress to enact laws to enhance human welfare. 18 Indeed,
the Patent Act seems to require that patents only be granted to “useful” inventions. 19
Yet despite these commitments, patent law and scholarship have taken a decidedly
laissez faire approach to the relationship between patents and welfare. 20 In this Part,
we briefly introduce the standard theory for how patent law can enhance human
well-being by solving a public goods problem in information. 21 We then show how
courts and scholars have generally rejected the possibility of closely connecting
patent doctrine—and especially particular patents—to well-being. Doing so, they
argue, would involve insurmountable data and judgment challenges. 22 Moreover,
many scholars believe that governmental attempts to connect patents to the well17 Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In full the clause grants Congress the power: “To promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.” For an account of the history of the clause and the relationship
between its parts see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J. 1771 (2006)
18 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440
U.S. 257 (1979); LANDES POSNER, supra note 4; RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF
CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex
Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004). But see ROBERT P.
MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
19 35 U.S.C. § 101.
20 Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1205 (2010) (hereinafter
Reinventing Usefulness); Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law
and the Promotion of Welfare, 1 HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 98
(Benjamin DePoorter & Peter Menell eds., 2019); Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic Intellectual
Property: Patents and Related Rights as Engines of Happiness, Peace, and Sustainability, 14 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 495 (2012).
21 We use the terms “welfare” and “well-being” interchangeably throughout this Article.
22 Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 20 at 1207 (“In practice, however, limiting patents to
those that meet a pre-determined degree of utility would likely be too costly and unworkable.”);
Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1374 (2009); Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 298 (2006); Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent
System, FED. LAWYER, 44, 49 (Feb. 2008).
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being they generate are unnecessary, because market forces are better determinants
of value than legal institutions. 23 We conclude, though, by noting that many
commentators are beginning to question the connection between patents and
welfare, especially in the context of pharmaceuticals. 24 Although in some ways,
pharmaceutical innovations are the shining lights of the patent regime, in many
others, including runaway prices and neglect of rare diseases or those that primarily
afflict the poor, pharma patents seem to do little to improve well-being.25
A. How Patent Law Tries to Improve the World
The standard economic justification for patent law is well known, and we
will only briefly rehearse it here. 26 In many cases, inventions are extremely costly
to create, but once they have been developed, they are often incredibly cheap to
copy.27 Most pharmaceuticals, for example, cost millions of dollars to develop and
bring to market, but producing the actual medicine that people consume is typically
inexpensive.28 In a world without patent law, competitors could simply wait to see
which drug innovations were effective and then produce these at substantially lower
prices than the inventors, because the copyists don’t bear any research and
development (R&D) costs. 29 Anticipating this behavior, firms will never bother to
invest resources in R&D, and society will forego the benefits of new inventions. 30
This is where patent law steps in. Patent law gives inventors of “any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” 31 a period of
exclusive rights during which they are the only ones who can make or sell products
that incorporate the patented invention. 32 During this period, patentees are
effectively monopolists with respect to their products, which means that they are
often able to charge prices for access to their inventions that substantially exceed
the marginal costs of making those products. 33 Thus, patented pharmaceuticals
typically sell for much higher prices than do identical generic drugs that enter the

Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 20, at 1206 n. 42.
Infra notes 64-75.
25 Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents – A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of
2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25, 26 (2007).
26 For lengthier treatments, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4; SUZANNE SCOTCHMER,
INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004).
27 Eric Budish, Benjamin Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation?
Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 19 NBER, Sept. 5, 2013; Margaret K. Kyle, Are Important
Innovations Rewarded? Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets, 53 REV. INDUST. ORG. 211, 215
(2018).
28 Kyle, supra note 27, at 213.
29 Long, supra note 22, at 45.
30 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV.
303, 310 (2013).
31 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
32 35 U.S.C. § 283 (20180
33 Long, supra note 22, at 45.
23
24
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market once the patent has expired. 34 By giving inventors an opportunity to charge
higher-than-marginal prices for access to inventions, patent law helps inventors
recoup their R&D costs. It thereby provides an incentive for their innovative
behavior.35
But patent law isn’t all sunshine and rainbows. As we detail below, 36 patent
law’s incentive benefits come with significant costs. Higher prices for patented
goods are borne by consumers or other payers (including insurance companies and
the government). Moreover, many people are priced out of the market for patented
goods, even though they would have been able and willing to pay prices based on
the marginal cost of goods.37 These people miss out on the benefits of the
innovation, at least until the patent expires. 38 Furthermore, patent law imposes a
number of other costs, including administrative costs of running the system and
costs for competitors who must expend effort searching for existing patents and
designing around them.39 The law’s goal is to develop a set of doctrines that
optimizes this tradeoff between incentives for current inventors and access for
consumers and competitors. Because granting patents produces both costs and
benefits, an ideal patent law would figure out how to do so only when the existence
of the patent incentive is worthwhile. 40
Importantly, patent law does not directly subsidize invention. 41 Rather, it
channels innovative activity through the market. 42 Patent law gives patent owners
the exclusive right to sell products that embody their inventions, but those rights
aren’t worth much if no one wants to buy their products. Just as a copyright in a
movie that no one wants to see is worthless, a patent that covers a product no one
wants to buy conveys little value to the inventor. Accordingly, inventors will direct
their efforts towards products that consumers want—which are generally products
that will make their lives better off. 43

Kyle, supra note 27, at 213; Budish, Roin, & Williams, supra note 27, at 19.
Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Research Investments?, 9 ANN. REV. ECON. 441, 442
(2017).
36 See infra Part I.C.
37 Economists refer to this as deadweight loss. Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent
Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 691 (2014).
38 If they’re still alive then.
39 Stefan Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Nature of Sequential
Innovation, 59 WM & MARY LAW REVIEW 1 (2017).
40 Roin, supra note 37, at 693 (“If the government could perfectly tailor patent awards, it could
maximize the amount of socially valuable innovation incentivized without causing any unnecessary
consumer deadweight loss.”).
41 See Hemel & Ouellette supra, note 30, at 346.
42 Sources cited in Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the
Promotion of Welfare, 1 HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 98, 102-03
(Benjamin DePoorter & Peter Menell eds., 2019).
43 On the relationship between patents and preference satisfaction see id.
34
35
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In its current form, patent law permits the market to determine which
inventions are valuable and worth pursuing. 44 But that is not a necessary or
inevitable state of affairs. In the alternative, the law might try to drive inventors
towards the kinds of inventions that are likely to have the biggest impact on social
welfare. Thus, policymakers might try to determine whether different industries are
more reliant on patent protection than others and then adjust the scope or duration
of patents accordingly.45 Going further, policymakers might try to fine-tune patent
protection at the invention level—that is, with respect to each patent. 46 The law
could try to weed out the inventions that do not increase social welfare and deny
them patent protection.47 Doing so could yield enormous welfare gains. 48
B. The Challenges of Connecting Patents to Well-Being
Patent law, however, has taken only limited steps to connect protection and
social value at the industry level, 49 and it has almost entirely avoided doing so at
the invention level.50 This is despite the fact that the law has an obvious candidate
in the Patent Act’s first section: § 101’s requirement that an invention be “useful.” 51
The PTO and the courts could read this language to entail an affirmative
requirement that patent applicants establish that their inventions are likely to
improve social welfare relative to the status quo. Although at times they have flirted
with this possibility, for the most part, “the requirement that an invention be useful
has been nearly nonexistent.”52 Impossible inventions like perpetual motions
machines might fall afoul of the standard, as could a chemical compound with no

Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA’s Role in Information Production, Past and
Future, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2357, 2363 (2018); Hollis, supra note 69, at 1; Kyle, supra note 27, at
214.
45 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1696 (2003).
46 Kyle, supra note 27, at 212 (“Specifically, if more important innovations provide higher returns
to society, then innovation policy should provide them with higher rewards.”).
47 Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010).
48 Carroll, supra note 22, at 1364 (“Uniformity cost is the social cost that arises when a particular
use has been assigned to the party who is less able to make a socially productive use of the
opportunity.”).
49 Roin, supra note 37, at 703 (“Patents almost always offer innovators the same set of legal
entitlements to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention and run for a
fixed twenty-year term beginning on the patent's filing date.”). The relatively few situations of
technology-specific patent law tend to relate to pharmaceuticals, including the term extensions
provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Orphan Drug Act. We discuss these doctrines at notes
115-119 infra.
50 Patent law’s nonobviousness doctrine is one effort to screen out inventions that would be socially
costly. KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (explaining patent law’s obviousness
doctrine); Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 47, at 690.
51 35 U.S.C. §101.
52 Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58 (2011)
(hereinafter Surprisingly Useful).
44
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known use.53 But otherwise, the PTO will not reject a patent application merely
because it fails to provide therapeutic gains over alternatives. 54
Scholars have defended patent law’s uniformity and its unwillingness to
consider a patent’s utility on a number of fronts.55 One obvious challenge is that
many products are the result of dozens or even hundreds of patented technologies. 56
A smartphone incorporates hundreds of different patents, so assigning relative
welfare values to any one of them would be impossible. 57 Even if it were possible
to connect patents more or less directly to products, other data challenges loom on
the horizon.58 A policymaker would need to know about a product’s sales and the
sales of its competitors in order to gauge its contribution to well-being.59 And, of
course, manipulating patent rights in response to a patent’s effect on well-being
requires policymakers to articulate a valid and reliable measure thereof. 60
Ultimately, then, most scholars have decided that the market is the most
competent institution to determine and reward inventive value. Markets allow value
to be measured ex post rather than ex ante, and they allow private individuals to
make decisions about which products provide them with the most satisfaction. 61
Moreover, to the extent that inventors develop products that people do not desire,
the standard theory suggests that only the inventors will bear the costs of their
mistakes.62 The firms and their investors will lose money if they fail to produce

Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046 (2014); Risch, Surprisingly
Useful, supra note 52, at 65-66.
54 Kyle, supra note 27, at 217. In fact, the PTO typically would not be in a position to make such a
determination at the time of a patent application, because patents on drugs are often filed well before
clinical testing for effectiveness has begun. “The first patent application is filed well before clinical
trials have been completed, and little information on therapeutic value exists at that point.”.
55 Long, supra note 22, at 49 (“The same might be said of a unitary patent system that Winston
Churchill famously said about democracy: It’s the worst form of patent system, except for all the
others that have been tried.”).
56 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (discussing the ways in which the holders of the
many patents necessary for research can hold up innovation in a field).
57 David S. Abrams & Bhaven N. Sampat, Drug Patent Citations and Value, draft on file with
authors, at 3 (“Unlike many complex manufactured products that may involve hundreds or
thousands of patents (e.g mobile phones or routers) drugs tend to depend on one or two key
patents.”).
58 Johnson, supra note 22, at 299 (“They depend upon inputs such as the importance of the invention,
which is difficult or impossible to calculate ex ante, and which would likely involve expensive
litigation or administrative costs if calculated ex post.”); Carroll, supra note 22, at 1374.
59 Roin, supra note 37, at 704 (“The lack of information about individual inventions also inhibits
the development of sound technology-specific laws, since the government often does not know
when to offer stronger or weaker patent rights and has difficulty administering the dividing lines
between technologies.”).
60 Risch, Surprisingly Useful, supra note 52, at 64 (“Many issues cannot be resolved by simple
appeal to the social good, because that goal is too general and progress toward it is too unmeasurable
to provide any practical aid to decisionmakers.”).
61 Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 20, at 1206.
62 Id.
53
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products that the market demands, but, otherwise, society experiences little
downside from their errors.63
C. How Patents and Markets May Be Failing in Pharma
Despite criticism of patent law’s effects on other areas of technology,
commenters consistently hold up the pharmaceutical industry as the shining
example of the success of the patent system.64 Pharma patents are much clearer than
software patents, so the contents of their disclosures are manifest. 65 And because
pharmaceuticals rely less on sequential innovation, where one technology builds on
another, they are less susceptible to trolls, thickets, and holdup. 66 Lastly,
pharmaceuticals require enormous R&D investments that make it easier to justify
long periods of exclusive rights compared to software.67
Yet while pharmaceuticals may demonstrate patent law at its most costjustified, their shine has been seriously tarnished. There is now a compendious
literature exploring the ways in which pharmaceutical innovations, although often
touted as patent law’s poster children, are, in fact, failing millions of people
globally.68 While pharmaceutical innovations are improving and saving lives
around the world, pharma firms, lured by the extravagant returns associated with
patented drugs, have largely failed to produce drugs that treat the needs of small
populations and of the poor.69 Very often, firms are producing “me too” drugs with
limited therapeutic value but, thanks to patents and insurance markets, massive
prices.70 We explain these issues further below.
Although economists prefer to rely on markets as the best means to estimate
the value of innovations, markets for pharmaceuticals are unusual in a number of
important ways.71 The demand side of the pharmaceutical market is especially
peculiar. Unlike in standard markets for smartphones or automobiles, the ultimate
consumers of pharmaceuticals—patients—are not primarily responsible either for
selecting products or paying for them.72 Doctors typically choose which drugs their
patients take, and, because doctors do not pay for the drugs, they have little reason
Id.
Carroll, supra note 22, at 1390. See also Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1578.
65 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46 (2009).
66 Long, supra note 22, at 45.
67 Kyle, supra 27, at 215.
68 Kapczynski, supra note 44, at 997; Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 42, at 7.
69 Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation, at 1, June 10, 2004, at
http://econ.ucalgary.ca/hollis.htm; Kapczynski, supra note 44, at 997
70 Kyle, supra note 27, at 211.
71 Id. at 212 (“In most markets, economists measure the value of an innovation with estimates of
demand. Markets aggregate information about a product’s quality, and we expect the its price and
market share to reflect this. In practice, this approach is difficult to apply in pharmaceutical markets,
for reasons that will be outlined in the following section. As a result, the link between price (or
profits) and social value—essential for innovation incentives—may be weak.”).
72 Id. at 212.
63
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to consider their relative prices. 73 In some cases, drug companies may even be
illegally paying doctors to prescribe their medications.74 Ultimately, insurance
companies and the government (through Medicaid, Medicare, and the Veterans
Administration) are responsible for paying the majority pharmaceutical prices, 75
and so far, their efforts to rein in rising drug prices have largely failed. 76 In a recent
study of prices of top-selling drugs between 2012 and 2017, the authors report a
median price increase of 76%, with three quarters of drug prices increasing by more
than 50% and almost half of prices more than doubling.77
Although the prices of patented drugs are rising at an astonishing pace,
perhaps these high prices are justified in light of the enormous value they’re
providing with lifesaving and life-improving innovations. Again, many
commentators are skeptical, and, again, they often blame the patent system. 78 One
of the patent system’s purported benefits is its reliance on markets to direct
innovation towards the most socially valuable R&D.79 As we’ve seen, this
connection may break down when purchasers and payers are not the ultimate
consumers of goods.80 And it is further eroded when consumers’ willingness or
ability to pay for products is not a good proxy for their social value. 81 The market
for pharmaceuticals exhibits exactly this disconnect. 82
Hollis, supra note 69, at 3 (“Second, pharmaceutical markets are extraordinary because the person
choosing the medicine (the physician) is not the consumer, and often the consumer does not pay, at
least directly. Thus similar but not identical medicines do not typically create strong price
competition.”).
74 Owen Dyer, Firm Bribed Doctors to Prescribe Overpriced Drug, US Alleges in Suit, 365 BRIT.
MED. J. (2019).
75 Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy,
NYU L. REV. 8 (forthcoming 2020) (“but here we note that most users don’t directly pay the
monopoly price for drugs. Rather, at least in developed countries, allocation of pharmaceuticals and
other biomedical technologies is usually mediated through public or private health insurance.”).
76 Id. at 3.
77 Nathan E. Wineinger, Yunyue Zhang & Eric J. Topol, Trends in Prices of Popular Brand-Name
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 4 (2019) (“In total, 17 drugs
(35%) more than doubled in costs, including Chantix, Cialis, Forteo, Lexapro, Lipitor, Lyrica, Onfi,
Premarin, Renvela, Simponi, Viagra, and Zetia; tumor necrosis factor inhibitors Enbrel and Humira;
and insulins Humalog, Humulin, and Novolog.”).
78 Kapczynski, supra note 44, at 936; Neel U. Sukhatme & M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care Costs
and the Arc of Innovation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 955 (2019); Hollis, supra note 69, at 3.
79 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 25-28,
80 See Christopher Buccafusco, Disability and Design, NYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
81 Carroll, supra note 22, at 1377 (“The information and product markets supported by intellectual
property rights operate on the basis of users' ability to pay rather than willingness to pay to reflect
the social value of innovation. As a result, the innovations or innovators selected for reward by "the
market" will skew toward the interests of those with an ability to pay, who more often than not are
the relatively rich.”).
82 Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 169 (2016) (“Consumers’ willingness to pay for any particular product
depends on its value to them. However, the social value of a drug is often poorly measured by the
sum of its value to each individual consumer. There are often significant externalities associated
with medical innovations that redound to the benefit of society, rather than the consumer, and are
therefore not incorporated into individual willingness to pay.”).
73
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On the one hand, as we’ve described, the existence of insurance payments
and guaranteed coverage makes treating certain diseases especially lucrative. 83 This
is true even for drugs that produce little or no additional therapeutic value compared
to their competitors.84 Accordingly, firms are motivated to produce “me too” drugs
to gain a share of the enormous markets for conditions covered by insurance. 85
Seeing the enormous markets available to first-in-class blockbuster drugs, other
pharmaceutical firms rush to enter the market with similar compounds. 86 For
example, the FDA approved the cholesterol-lowering drug pitavastatin in 2009,
making it the eighth statin drug approved in the US.87 By that point, the first-inclass drug had already been in the public domain and was available generically for
eight years.88 Although some of this behavior may be the result of efficient patent
races or of drugs that respond to the heterogeneity of patients’ needs, 89 many
commentators view “me too” drugs as producing little overall value. 90 While they
do not add much in the way of additional therapeutic gains, they simultaneously
dissipate the rents (and thus the incentives) for the first-in-class drug.91
On the other hand, some diseases that primarily affect small or poor
populations will not attract substantial investments, because the reward prospects
are insufficient to justify R&D expenditures. When people are not covered by
comprehensive insurance schemes like those in the developed world, their ability
to pay for lifesaving medication is seriously diminished. Although better treatments
for malaria and tuberculosis could have huge impacts on global well-being,
pharmaceutical firms may underinvest in them because they will not make as much
money as they can by treating rich people’s diseases. 92 In addition, diseases that
affect small populations, even if they are covered by insurance, will be undertreated
by a pharmaceutical industry driven by market rewards.93 If only a few thousand
Lemley, Ouellette & Sachs, supra note 75at 10 (“Part B covers all services and products which
are “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury,” a phrase which is
defined neither by the statute nor by regulations.”).
84 Hollis, supra note 69, at 5.
85 Id.
86 Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry, How Many “Me-Too” Drugs is Too Many?, 305 J. AM.
MED. ASSOC. 711 (2011).
87 Id. at 711.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See e.g., Bishal Gyawali & Vinay Prasad, Me-Too Drugs with Limited Benefits – The Tale of
Regorafenib for HCC, 14 Nature Rev. Clin. Oncology 653 (2017); A.S. Kesselheim et al., Clinical
Equivalence of Generic and Brand-Name Drugs Used in Cardiovascular Disease: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis., 300 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 2514 (2008); Aidan Hollis, Me-too drugs: is
there a problem? Submission to the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property and Public Health
(13
December
2004)
at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/MetooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf.
91 Hollis, supra note 69, at 5.
92 See Michael Kremer, Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 67,
68-69 (2002).
93 Bryan A. Liang & Tim Mackey, Reforming Off-Label Promotion to Enhance Orphan Disease
Treatment, 327 SCIENCE 273 (2010).
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people may need a treatment, firms will be less likely to invest in it, even if the
treatment could produce much greater per-person benefits than other treatments that
are used by millions of people. The 1983 Orphan Drug Act94 has taken some steps
to address this issue, but for reasons we discuss in Part III, we think it insufficiently
aligns drugmakers’ incentives with human welfare.
D. Can the FDA Help?
We might hope that the FDA, as the regulatory body that oversees the
market for pharmaceuticals, could help solve some of these concerns. In many
respects, however, the FDA is poorly positioned to respond. Unlike some of its
European counterparts, the FDA does not condition marketability on costeffectiveness.95 If a drug is deemed safe and effective, it can be approved for
marketing. In addition, the length of the FDA’s clinical trials further distorts R&D
spending.96 And efforts to limit the duration and expense of clinical trials likely
produce worse data on therapeutic value, allowing more low-quality
pharmaceuticals on the market. 97 The substantial number of “reversals” of clinical
trials, showing that drugs may be no better—or far worse—than existing
alternatives indicates the scope of the problem.98
In the US, the FDA regulates the marketability of pharmaceuticals. The
FDA will only approve the sale of a pharmaceutical drug to patients if the firm that
owns the drug can prove that it is safe and effective.99 Typically, this involves
several rounds of clinical trials that initially determine whether the drug is toxic in
non-human and human populations and then consider whether it effectively treats
one or more diseases. But “effective” as used in the law and as interpreted by the
FDA does not necessarily mean that the treatment is better than existing treatments,
and it certainly does not mean that the new treatment is a cost-effective one. A
drug’s sponsor need only generate data demonstrating that the drug produces some
improvement in outcomes for at least a subpopulation of those with the disease. 100
21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a).
Denis Roland, Obscure Model Puts a Price on Good Health—and Drives Down Drug Costs,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2019) https://www.wsj.com/articles/obscure-model-puts-a-price-on-goodhealthand-drives-down-drug-costs-11572885123.
96 Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 27, at 1-2.
97 Vinay Prasad, Do Cancer Drugs Improve Survival or Quality of Life?, 359 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1
(Oct. 4, 2017); John Mandrola, Adam Cifu, Vinay Prasad & Andrew Foy, The Case for Being a
Medical Conservative, AM. J. MED. 900 (2019); Diana Herrera-Perez, et al., A Comprehensive
Review of Randomized Clinical Trials in Three Medical Journals Reveals 396 Medical Reversals,
8 ELIFE 1, 2 (2019), at https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.45183; Margaret Kyle & Heidi L. Williams, Is
American Health Care Uniquely Inefficient?: Evidence from Prescription Drugs, NBER Working
Paper Series 23068, at 5, Jan. 2017.
98 Herrera-Perez et al., supra note 97, at 1 (“Medical reversals are a subset of low-value medical
practices and are defined as practices that have been found, through randomized controlled trials, to
be no better than a prior or lesser standard of care.”).
99 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
100 Sukhatme & Bloche, supra note 78, at 982.
94
95
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This data often comes from studies run by the patent owners,101 and there are many
commentators who are concerned about statistical manipulation of trial results. 102
A burgeoning medical literature has described numerous flaws in FDA clinical
trials, including the use of non-clinical data,103 the lack of randomly-controlled
trials,104 and non-representative study populations,105 all of which tend to overstate
a drug’s efficacy.106
Further research by Eric Budish, Benjamin Roin, and Heidi Williams has
shown how variations in the length of FDA clinical trials affect firm’s R&D
choices.107 US patent law gives inventors a fixed 20-year term of protection, but
the effective length of market exclusivity is shortened by the time it takes to conduct
clinical trials.108 Thus, the shorter the clinical trials, the longer the effective patent
term. Generally, treatments for late-stage cancers involve shorter clinical trials than
early-stage cancers, because it takes less time to demonstrate potential
effectiveness.109 With late-stage cancers, patients die much more quickly, so
success or failure happens sooner. The authors demonstrate that firms have
responded to this effective manipulation of patent duration by focusing
significantly greater resources on late-stage cancer research than early-stage cancer
research—even though treating early-stage cancers would likely produce much
greater social value.
While reasonable minds could differ about the FDA’s success at ensuring
the quality of pharmaceutical available in the US, there is no doubt that it has failed
to help with cost containment. This is because the FDA does not evaluate a drug’s
cost-effectiveness as a condition of its approval.110 While many European
administrative agencies consider whether to approve a drug according to the
relative cost of treatment outcomes, neither the FDA nor Medicare make these sorts
of decisions.111 Thus, if a drug’s sponsor can show that it will make even a modest
improvement in treatment outcomes for some group of potential patients, the FDA
will approve the drug even though its cost may be many times greater than
Chi Heem Wong, Kien Wei Siah & Andrew Lo, Estimation of Clinical Trial Success Rates and
Related Parameters, 20 BIOSTATISTICS 273, 273 (2019).
102 See e.g. Vinay Prasad, Do Cancer Drugs Improve Survival or Quality of Life? 359 BRIT. MED.
J. (Oct. 4, 2017); Kapczynski, supra note 44, at 2369.
103 James D. Chambers, Teja Thorat, Colby L. Wilkinson & Peter J. Neumann, Drugs Cleared
Through the FDA’s Expedited Review Offer Greater Gains Than Drugs Approved By Conventional
Process, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1408 (2017) (hereinafter Expedited Review).
104 Brett K. Beauliue-Jones et al., Examining the Use of Real‐World Evidence in the Regulatory
Process, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 1, 2 (Sept. 17, 2019).
105 See Chadi Nabhan, Andrew Klink & Vinay Prasad, Real-world Evidence: What Does It Really
Mean?, 5 JAMA 781 (2019). See also Beauliue-Jones et al., supra note 104, at 2.
106 See Mandrola, Cifu, Prasad and Foy, supra note 97, at 2.
107 Budish, Roin, & Williams supra note 27, at 2.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 3.
110 Loren Lorenzetti, Is it time for the FDA to consider cost when it comes to new drugs?, FORTUNE
(February 4, 2015).
111 Sukhatme & Bloche, supra note 78, at 987-88.
101
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alternative treatments. 112 It is not entirely surprising that the FDA does not consider
a drug’s cost in its approval decisions, considering where the agency sits in the
product’s lifecycle. At the time the FDA decides whether to approve a drug, it has
not been on the market, and thus its price is not yet known. Accordingly, there may
be little the FDA can do to connect patents with aggregate social utility.
*

*

*

The pharmaceutical industry is thought to show the patent system at its best,
incentivizing breakthrough innovations that would not have come about but for the
promise of exclusive rights.113 But patent law’s one-size-fits-all, market-oriented
approach has drawn attention to the ways in which it may fail to maximize social
value. Is there an alternative? Could we figure out which innovations are, in fact,
generating the most social value? And if so, could patent law do anything to
incentivize research in those directions? We turn to these questions in the next two
Parts.
II. CONNECTING PHARMA PATENTS TO THEIR EFFECTS ON WELL-BEING
Although we may never know how much each of the hundreds of patents
involved in smartphone technology affects human well-being, new data are able to
estimate the relative effects of pharmaceutical patents on welfare. Recent research
in hedonic psychology—the scientific study of well-being and happiness—is
providing increasingly valid and reliable tools for measuring how various
experiences, including taking pharmaceuticals, affects people’s lives. 114 That data
can be combined with data on the patents associated with pharmaceuticals to study
whether and to what extent various patents are making people better off. First, we
discuss the methodological strategies of connecting patents with well-being data,
and then we report some results from recent studies of the efficacy of
pharmaceutical innovations. Ultimately, the story is decidedly mixed: Although
some new pharmaceuticals are dramatically improving patients’ lives, many others
are no better or worse than established alternatives.
A. Patents, QALYs, and Well-Being

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1578.
114 See Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al eds., 1999) [hereinafter Objective Happiness]; Ed Diener,
Richard Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack & John Helliwell, Defining Well-being, in WELL-BEING FOR
PUBLIC POLICY (2009); William Comanor, Stuart Schweitzer, Tanya Carter, A Hedonic Model of
Pricing of Innovative Pharmaceuticals, in HEALTH POLICY AND HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT (2005); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being
Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013) (hereinafter WBA).
112
113
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The first challenge in connecting patents with their effects on welfare is
isolating the patents involved in pharmaceutical products. Recent research by Scott
Hemphill and Bhaven Sampat has shown this to be possible.115 The Hatch-Waxman
Act requires drug companies to list the most pertinent patents covering a drug in
the FDA publication Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, also known as the Orange Book. 116 Hemphill and Sampat find that
while each drug is associated with, on average, 2.7 total patents, almost all drugs
are covered by a single “active ingredient” patent. 117 After this patent expires,
generic versions of the drug tend to enter the market. 118 In separate analysis, David
Abrams and Sampat have explored which of the multiple patents associated with a
drug is chosen for extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act’s period of regulatory
compensation.119 Using this approach, they can assess which patent covers the
active or main ingredient in the drug, and their findings strongly correlate with
Hemphill and Sampat’s data.120
The bigger empirical challenge involves connecting pharmaceutical patents
to their effects on patient welfare, but new research is now making this possible.
Much of this research is inspired by the field of hedonic psychology, which
attempts to scientifically measure how well individuals’ lives are going.121 Over the
last several decades, scientists have made considerable strides in developing valid
and reliable tools for studying and comparing people’s experiences. This work
reflects a turn from decision utility—judging people’s welfare based on the choices
they make—toward experience utility—judging people’s welfare based on how
they feel about their experiences. 122

C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 613 (2011) [hereinafter Drug Patents]; C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N.
Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J.
HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012) [hereinafter Evergreening].
116 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, FDA (40TH ed. 2019).
117 Hemphill & Sampat, Evergreening, supra note 115, at 330.
118 Hemphill & Sampat, Drug Patents, supra note 115, at 615.
119 David S. Abrams & Bhaver N. Sampat, Drug Patent Citations & Value, NBER 1, 8 (2018).
120 Id. at 8. There is now substantial evidence that drug companies file additional patents related to
their active ingredient patents in an attempt to extend periods of exclusivity. Amy Kapczynski, Chan
Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of
“Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE, 1 (2012); Lisa L. Ouellette, How Many Patents
Does It Take to Make a Drug - Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299 (2010). These patents typically cover different
formulations of the active ingredient or alternative dosage regimes and delivery mechanisms. This
strategy, known as “evergreening,” raises a number of concerns about the length and breadth of
pharmaceutical patents, but it does not affect researchers’ ability to isolate the principal active
ingredient patent associated with each drug. Accordingly, we are confident that in the great majority
of cases, it will be possible to determine the patent that supports the pharmaceutical.
121 Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 114, at 4-5.
122 Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 673 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
115
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The shift toward experiences is especially appropriate in the context of
pharmaceuticals for a number of reasons. First, as we have seen, people’s choices
about which drugs they take are not likely to be strong proxies for the welfare, due
to the numerous distortions of the drug market. 123 Although we might trust people
to choose whether they will get more happiness from a Ford or a Jaguar, we should
be less confident that their choices between medications—if they even get to make
any—are rational and well-informed.124 Second, pharmaceuticals affect people’s
lives in a variety of different ways, and policymakers should have data that reflect
those experiences. Measuring the success of a new drug in terms of patients’ fiveyear survival rates ignores an enormous amount of information that we might care
about.125 Obviously, many drugs treat conditions that do not cause death. Knowing
that the five-year survival rate of an acne medication is 99% tells us very little about
the drug’s effectiveness. In addition, many people are likely to care not just about
their absolute survival but also the quality of their lives.126 People might rationally
believe that surviving for three years in fairly good health is better than surviving
for five years in miserable health. 127 Accordingly, scientists need tools that will
capture the nuances of patients’ experiences.
We believe that the best way to measure a drug’s effect on well-being is to
survey people who are taking the drug and ask them how they are feeling. 128 As we
have argued at length elsewhere, the best way to study people’s welfare is to
measure the range of positive and negative emotions that they experience during
some period of time. 129 Research tools such as the experience sampling method
(ESM), which uses smartphones to randomly query people about what they are
doing and how happy or unhappy they are, can provide fine-grained data about
individual well-being.130 People’s self-reports about their current experiences
generate the most valid and reliable data on how they are doing.131 For our

See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 114, at 1607. See also Tara O’Neill Hayes,
Market Distortions Caused by the 340B Prescription Drug Program, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM
(Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/340bmarketdistortions/.
124 Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255 (2017);
Hollis, supra note 69, at 3.
125 Daniel Chisholm, Andrew Healy & Martin Knapp, QALYs and Mental Health Care, 32 SOC.
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 68, 68 (1997).
126 Milton C. Weinstein, George Torrance & Alistair McGuire, QALYs: The Basics, 12 VALUE
HEALTH S5, S5 (2009).
127 Amiram Gafni, Economic Evaluation of Health-Care Programmes: Is CEA Better Than CBA?,
34 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 407, 408 (2006).
128 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 114, at 1617.
129 Id. at 1617-1620.
130 See Iris H.L. Maes, et al., Measuring Health-Related Quality of Life by Experiences: The
Experience Sampling Method, 18 VALUE HEALTH 44, 44 (2015); Alan B. Krueger, Daniel
Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, National Time Accounting: The
Currency of Life, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
OF TIME AND WELL-BEING 9, 30 (Alan B. Krueger ed., 2009).
131 See Diener et al., supra note 114, at 71-73; Dylan M. Smith, Ryan L. Sherriff, Laura
Damschroder, George Loewenstein, & Peter A. Ubel, Misremembering Colostomies? Former
123

17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565320

Drugs, Patents, and Well-Being
purposes, we could imagine studies that track people’s responses to ESM questions
during their treatment with a patented pharmaceutical and compare them to
responses from people who are using an alternative treatment. 132 Studies like these
would provide extraordinarily precise data about people’s treatment, including
information not only about their health states but also their emotions and moods.133
Although such studies would provide the “gold standard” for well-being
comparisons, they are expensive to run (especially for long periods of time) and
would create substantial impositions on patients.134
For longer term effects, such as for treatments that last several years or
more, scientists can use other means for measuring people’s experiences. One of
the most common forms of hedonic psychology research relies on questions about
people’s life satisfaction which are typically included in larger survey instruments
such as the General Social Survey. 135 Life satisfaction surveys include one or more
questions that ask respondents something like: “All things considered, how
satisfied with your life are you these days?”136 Although life satisfaction surveys
do not provide the fine-grained data of ESM studies, they can be used to track
people through treatments over a longer period of time.137 For example, researchers
have used life satisfaction data to explore patient’s experiences with different
treatments for breast cancer,138 kidney transplants,139 and ADHD.140
As we have explained in prior work, policymakers can use data from ESM
and life satisfaction surveys to compute the number of “well-being units”
(“WBUs”) that people experience as a result of some change in an aspect of their
lives.141 The best hedonic surveys track individual well-being on a scale of -10 to
10, where 0 is equivalent to death or unconsciousness, and the ends of the scale
represent the extremes of negative and positive experience. One WBU is equivalent
Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings Than Do Current Patients, 25 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 688, 691
(2006).
132 See Inez Myin-Germeys et al., Experience Sampling Methodology in Mental Health Research:
New Insights and Technical Developments, 17 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 123, 123 (2018).
133 Ingrid Kramer et al., A Therapeutic Application of the Experience Sampling Method in the
Treatment of Depression: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 13 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 68, 68 (2014).
134 Alan B. Krueger et al., supra note 130, at 30.
135 Diener et al., supra note 114, at 19.
136 See William Pavot & Ed Diener, Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale, 5 PSYCHOL.
ASSESSMENT 164, 164 (1993) (discussing the strength of the Satisfaction with Life Scale and
referring to the fact that it is a “judgmental process, in which individuals assess the quality of their
lives on the basis of a unique set of criteria”).
137 Andrew E. Clark, Ed Diener, Yannis Georgellis & Richard E. Lucas, Lags and Leads in Life
Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J. F222, F231 (2008).
138 Marianne Carlsson, et al., Evaluation of Quality of Life/Life Satisfaction in Women with Breast
Cancer in Complementary and Conventional Care, 43 ACTA ONCOLOGY 27 (2003).
139 Arthur J. Matas, et al., Life Satisfaction and Adverse Effects in Renal Transplant Recipients: A
Longitudinal Analysis, 16 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 113 (2002).
140 Aribert Rothenberger, Andreas Becker, Dieter Breurer & Manfred Dopfner, An Observational
Study of Once-Daily Modified-Release Methylphenidate in ADHD: Quality of Life, Satisfaction with
Treatment, and Adherence, 20 EUR. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY S257 (2011).
141 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, WBA, supra note 114, at 1643.
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to one point on the hedonic scale for one person for one year. 142 Thus, if an
individual took a drug that raised her well-being from 7 to 8 for one year, that drug
would have created one WBU of welfare. If 10 people each took a drug that raised
their well-being from 5 to 8, and they took these drugs over a period of 10 years,
this would yield an overall gain of 10 people × 3 points × 10 years = 300 WBUs.
The use of WBUs thus offers a mechanism for rigorously measuring welfare
changes over time, including those attributable to external factors such as new
drugs.
Although ESM and life satisfaction studies are increasingly popular,
researchers and governments have come to rely on a metric called Quality Adjusted
Life Years (QALYs) to determine the effectiveness of medical treatments across a
wide variety of contexts.143 While it is important to know how many lives a new
drug saves or how many years it adds to patients’ expected survival, these data paint
an incomplete picture of the drug’s effects on well-being. As we noted, the quality
of a person’s life is as important to her welfare as is its length, and the QALY
provides a mechanism for studying the effects of different medical treatments. 144
Many European countries mandate QALY comparisons for health technology
appraisals and cost-effectiveness studies, because they provide a single measure for
evaluating alternatives. 145 Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies also have
significant experience with them. 146
To measure QALYs, researchers assess the number of years of life gained
from a new treatment relative to the status quo treatment. 147 Then they discount
(i.e., multiply) those additional life years by the health-related quality of life
(“HRQoL”) that patients experience during them. 148 HRQoL is assessed on a scale

Id. at 1643-44.
Chisholm et al., supra note 125, at 69-70; Sarah J. Whitehead & Shehzad Ali, Health Outcomes
in Economic Evaluation: The QALY and Utilities, 96 BRIT. MED. BULL. 5, 13-14 (2010); Nancy J.
Devlin & Paula K. Lorgelly, QALYs as a Measure of Value in Cancer, 11 J. OF CANCER POL’Y 19,
20-21 (2017).
144 Chisolm et al., supra note 125, at 68 (“[T]he QALY transcends unidimensional measures such
as life expectancy improvements or 5-year survival rates as indicators of the success or failure of
medical intervention.”).
145 Hollis, supra note 69, at 16 (“There is very extensive experience with evaluating QALYs related
to drug treatments, since a large number of governments and other insurers all over the world use
such an approach…”); Whitehead & Ali, supra note 140, at 6 (2010) (“The use of QALYs is
required by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK for health
technology assessment); Hollis, supra note 90, at 2 (“While imperfect, the use of QALYs enables a
comparison to be made between the therapeutic benefits of different drugs in a standardized way
and thus to find a meaningful measure of the social value of an innovation. The implementation of
the QALY technique in deciding which pharmaceuticals to fund in a number of jurisdictions around
the world has been highly successful, and it offers strong encouragement for a broader application
of QALYs to determining how to reward pharmaceutical innovations.”).
146 Hollis, supra note 69, at 17 (“Drug companies have also used QALY-type analysis themselves
in order to demonstrate economic effectiveness of treatments.”).
147 Devlin & Lorgelly, supra note 143, at 20.
148 Id.
142
143
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that runs from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates perfect health and 0 indicates death. 149
Negative numbers can represent states worse than death. 150 In most studies,
researchers assess HRQoL along several different dimensions, including the
severity of problems with mobility, self-care, performing usual activities, pain, and
anxiety/depression.151 The relative weights of each of these domains is judged by
medical professions and members of public, rather than patients themselves (an
issue we discuss further below). 152 For example, if a new cancer treatment extends
patients’ lives by four years relative to the status quo, and those four years are spent,
on average, at a level of 0.65 HRQoL, then the drug is responsible for creating 4 ×
0.65 = 2.6 QALYs per patient. If one thousand patients receive the treatment, the
drug would generate 2,600 QALYs. In some European countries, these data are
combined with the cost of the treatment to determine whether it is cost effective. In
the next Part, we argue that the PTO can use QALY data to manipulate the size of
the incentives given to pharmaceutical companies.
We should note, however, that QALY data are not a perfect proxy for
human welfare.153 There is no such measure, so the important question for
policymakers is whether QALYs are better than the alternative, which, in this case,
means no data at all. It is also important to be aware of the limitations with using
QALY data. First, QALYs are typically assessed with reference to the patient
receiving treatment, but medical treatments can have many spillover effects.154
Vaccines and treatments for communicable diseases don’t just help people who
receive them, but everyone in society. And a pharmaceutical that enables patients
to return to work can improve the lives of their children, spouses, and caregivers.155
In addition, as we explained, HRQoL weights are assessed by asking
medical professionals and members of the public how bad they think being in
certain health states is. 156 There is substantial evidence, though, that healthy people
are systematically bad at predicting how various health states would make them
feel.157 Because healthy people focus on becoming unhealthy rather than being
unhealthy, and because they do not account sufficiently for the effects of hedonic
Chisolm, supra note 125, at 68. See also Devlin & Lorgelly, supra note 143, at 20.
Devlin & Lorgelly supra note 143, at 20 (“QALYs are estimated by multiplying the length of
life in each health state by its HRQoL weight. The weights are on a scale anchored at 1 (full health)
and 0 (a health state so bad it is as bad as being dead), with negative values indicating a health state
considered to be worse than being dead.”).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 19-20.
153 Id. at 21.
154 Id. at 21.
155 See Whitehead & Ali, supra note 140, at 17 (“An improvement in the health of a woman/man
with children may impact on the health of their children and may also help her/him return to work
more quickly.”); see also Devlin & Lorgelly, supra note 143, at 23 (“There may be wider benefits
to society from treating cancer. For example, the reduced mortality and morbidity from cancer may
enable cancer patients to return to work more quickly, or to contribute in other (non-income earning)
ways to society, for example by caring for others or undertaking voluntary work.”).
156 Id. at 16.
157 Id.
149
150
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adaptation to new experiences, they tend to overestimate both the magnitude and
duration of negative experiences.158 In addition, QALY measurements focus
primarily on physical health rather than mental health and well-being, so they may
not fully capture the effects of a treatment on patients’ feelings and emotions. 159
Accordingly, they may understate the value of treatments for mental health
disorders or ones that increase pleasure. For these reasons, we encourage increased
use of ESM studies for pharmaceuticals, but we believe that QALY-based measures
represent a vast improvement over the alternatives. Until better well-being
measures become widely available, QALYs are a worthwhile mechanism for
assessing health outcomes from drugs and medical treatments.
B. Which Patented Pharmaceuticals Improve Well-Being?
The past two decades have witnessed increased efforts by scholars and
government agencies to assess the well-being impacts of new pharmaceuticals. 160
How often are they worth the enormous R&D investments and astronomical prices?
The data are decidedly mixed. New treatments for some conditions have generated
meaningful improvements over earlier options, but the story for many other
patented pharmaceuticals is bleaker. 161 Below we report the findings of a number
of recent studies to illustrate the broad variation in pharmaceutical effectiveness.
First, the good news. In a study of the relative effectiveness of new
pharmaceuticals approved by the FDA between 1999 and 2011, James Chambers
and colleagues report a number of drugs that produced meaningful improvements
over previous options.162 The two largest successes in terms of QALYs per person
were deferasirox (Exjade), which treats hemosiderosis, an excess iron
accumulation, and produces average gains of 4.2 QALYs per person, and imatinib
mesylate (Gleevec), which treats leukemia and produces gains of 4.1 QALYs per
person.163 Although these drugs come with astronomical price tags ($168,469 and

Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein & Christopher Jepson, Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic
Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 111 (2005); Peter A. Ubel et al., Do Nonpatients
Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health Conditions Because of a
Focusing Illusion?, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190, 197 (2001).
159 Rebecca Johnson, et al., Where’s WALY?: A Proof of Concept Study of the “Well-being Adjusted
Life Year” Using Secondary Analysis of Cross-Sectional Survey Data, 14 HEALTH & QUALITY OF
LIFE OUTCOMES 126 (2016) (“[T]the fact that we found a ceiling effect in the EQ-5D-3L (as have
others before us [51], with nearly three quarters of participants at the maximum score reinforces the
likelihood that it does not capture relevant changes that matter to individuals or, therefore, to
economic evaluations.”).
160 Nabhan, Klink & Prasad, supra note 105, at 781.
161 Kyle, supra note 27, at 219.
162 James D. Chambers et al., Despite High Costs, Specialty Drugs May Offer Value For Money
Comparable To That Of Traditional Drugs, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1751, 1752 (2014) [hereinafter
Specialty Drugs]
163 Id. at 1756.
158
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$151,746 incremental costs, respectively), 164 they are doing a great deal of good for
the patients that receive them. Three additional drugs also produced at least one
QALY improvement over the status quo, and one of them, bosentan (Tracleer), a
treatment for pulmonary arterial hypertension, does so at a cost that is $100,000
less that the alternative.165 Sixteen out of the 102 drugs in the sample produced at
least half of a quality adjusted life year on average.166
Because policymakers care about the total welfare produced by new
pharmaceuticals and not just the welfare per patient, it is essential to know whether
drugs are treating large or small populations. Adding four QALYs to one person’s
life is generally not as valuable as adding one QALY to one hundred people’s
lives.167 While there certainly could be situations in which, for distributional equity
reasons, policymakers might favor providing smaller benefits to one group over
larger benefits to another, drugs that treat larger populations are, all else equal, more
socially valuable.168 Thus, from the perspective of a policymaker, what matters is
overall welfare across the entire population (though of course the policymaker
might want to focus on improving the welfare of those people who are least well
off). Hundreds of QALYs will always outweigh just a few QALYs. Accordingly,
in a subsequent study, Chambers and colleagues collected data on the U.S.
incidence of diseases from the Centers for Disease Control and the National Cancer
Institute.169 They then calculated the aggregate number of QALYs per
pharmaceutical if ten percent of the population with the condition received it. 170
Interestingly, the results differ meaningfully from the previous study. Although
imatinib (Gleevec) produced more than four QALYs per person, only about 64,000
Americans suffer from leukemia. 171 Its estimated aggregate benefit, then, was only
about 26,000 QALYs if ten percent of those people receive treatment. 172 By
comparison, drugs that treated conditions with much higher incidence, such as high
cholesterol, diabetes, hepatitis C, HIV, and smoking addiction generated
significantly higher aggregate QALYs.173 For example, 60 million Americans
Id.
Id.
166 Id.
167 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 114, at 1632-33. But see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 140 (1971) (“[T]he principle of average utility directs society to maximize not the total
but the average utility (per capita).”).
168 On the distributional concerns of IP policy see e.g. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the
Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV.
257 (2006).
169 James D. Chambers et al., Estimating Population Health Benefits Associated with Specialty and
Traditional Drugs in the Year Following Product Approval, 15 APPL. HEALTH ECON. HEALTH
POL’Y 227, 228-30 (2017) [hereinafter Estimating Population]
170 Id. at 230. Ten percent was chosen to provide a conservative estimate. It is, of course, trivially
easy to redo the math with different assumptions.
171
Id.
at
app.
tble
1,
online
supplement,
available
at
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40258-016-0291-9#Sec15.
172 Id.
173 Id at 231.
164
165
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suffer from high cholesterol, and although ezetimibe only produced 0.172 QALYs
per person compared to the standard treatment, if ten percent of those people get
the drug, it would produce 1.1 million QALYs.174 Pioglitazone, which was
approved to treat type 2 diabetes in 1999, generates 0.170 QALYs per person, but
if given to ten percent of the 18 million people with the disease, it would create an
additional 696,680 QALYs.175 According to Chambers and colleagues’ data,
fourteen drugs would generate at least 100,000 QALYs under their assumptions.176
Unfortunately, for many more pharmaceuticals, the story is not as
promising. First, many molecular entities that receive patents do not enter into FDA
clinical trials at all, presumably because their sponsors do not believe they are likely
to produce promising results. Of the drugs that do enter clinical trials, the vast
majority fail to win approval. In a new study, Wong, Siah, and Lo estimate that
only 13.8% of drug development programs result in approval, 177 and their estimates
are higher than some others.178 In 2019, the FDA only approved forty-eight novel
drugs, and nine of these were approved on the basis of surrogate endpoints rather
than clinical ones.179 This means that the drugs could gain approval without
showing a direct treatment effect if they could at least show some positive effect on
another “surrogate” outcome that is correlated with the treatment effect. 180 But
relying on surrogate endpoints rather than clinical ones can dramatically
overestimate a drug’s total therapeutic effect.181 Thus, most patented
pharmaceuticals fail to meet the FDA’s standards for safety and effectiveness, and
those that meet it may do so on data of dubious reliability.182
In addition, the fact that the FDA has judged a drug to be effective does not
mean that the drug represents an improvement over existing treatment options. In
the studies by Chambers and colleagues, substantial percentages of drugs were
estimated to be no more effective or less effective than existing options. That is,
they produced zero or negative QALYs.183 One of their studies found this to be true
for 39% of the drugs studied, 184 and another estimated that 32% had zero or
Id.
Id.
176 Id.
177 Wong, Siah & Lo, supra note 101, at 277.
178 Michael Hay, David W. Thomas, John L. Craighead, Celia Economides & Jesse Rosenthal,
Clinical Development Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 32 NATURE BIOTECH. 40 (2014)
(estimating a 10.4% success rate); David W. Thomas, et al., Clinical Development Success Rates
2006–2015, BIOMEDTRACKER (2016) (estimating a 9.6% success rate).
179 Asher Mullard, 2019 FDA Drug Approvals, 19 NATURE REV.: DRUG DISCOVERY 79 (2020). The
five-year rolling average is forty-four approvals per year. Id. at 79.
180 Ross L. Prentice, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Definition and Operational Criteria, 8
STAT. MED. 431–440 (1989); Beauliue-Jones et al., supra note 104, at 2.
181 Beauliue-Jones et al., supra note 104, at 2.
182 In addition, many clinical trials are run by the drug’s sponsoring firm rather than by independent
organizations, and the trials involve ideal patient populations who are likely to respond better to the
treatment than will real world populations. See Diana Herrera-Perez, supra note 97, at 2-3 (2019);
Nabhan, Klink & Prasad, supra note 105, at 781–82.
183 James D. Chambers et al., Expedited Review, supra note 103, at 1410.
184 Id. at 1410.
174
175
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negative QALY impact. 185 In the latter study of 102 new drugs, nineteen were
“dominated” by the alternative. That is, they were both less effective and more
expensive than the comparator treatment. 186 Moreover, another one-third of the
drugs in this study generated fewer than 0.1 incremental QALYs. 187 Importantly,
many of these poorly performing drugs would not treat especially large populations,
so their aggregate therapeutic value is also low (or negative).
These disappointing results have been corroborated by other studies using
different datasets. Abrams and Sampat studied new molecular entities approved in
the US between 1987 and 2011. 188 The median incremental QALY improvement
per drug was only 0.09 (approximately one additional month of life at perfect
health), and 25% of the drugs in their sample have negative incremental QALYs. 189
Margaret Kyle analyzed 352 new pharmaceuticals that reached the market
between 2000 and 2016. 190 She compared these drugs’ prices to their assessments
by France’s Haute Authorité de Santé, which scores drugs based on whether they
represent improvements over existing standards. 191 Major improvements are scored
1, while those with no additional benefit are scored 5.192 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
imatinib (Gleevec) scored 1. 193 But almost half of the drugs in the sample (169)
received a score of 5, while another quarter received a score of 4. 194 Despite their
poor performance, however, these low scoring drugs were not significantly cheaper
than their higher scoring counterparts. 195
These sorts of relatively useless “me too” drugs nevertheless exist because
the market for pharmaceuticals creates incentives for firms to develop them. Even
if a drug represents at most a very incremental improvement on the status quo, it
might succeed in winning substantial market share through effective marketing and
outreach. The drug could become highly profitable even without contributing
significantly to welfare, compared with treatments that preceded it. Thus, while
pharmaceutical companies have produced some important breakthrough drugs that
have benefitted thousands of patients, they have also produced many products that
are outright failures from the standpoint of therapeutic outcomes (though not
necessarily from the standpoint of profit). As we discuss in the next section, these
failures have considerable social costs.
C. Innovation Failures are Socially Costly

Chambers et al., Specialty Drugs, supra note 162, at 1755.
Id. at 1754.
187 Id.
188 Abrams & Sampat, supra note 119, at 11.
189 Abrams & Sampat, supra note 119, at 11.
190 Kyle, supra note 27, at 219.
191 Id. at 218.
192 Id.
193 Id at 219.
194 Id at 219–20.
195 Id. at 224, 226.
185
186
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If the authors of this paper were to quit their jobs as professors to form a
boy band, their decision would primarily generate private costs for themselves and
their families. Having invested resources in a project with no possible audience,
they would fail to recoup their costs. This is the disciplining power of the market.
But the market for pharmaceuticals is different, for the reasons discussed in Part I.
These differences mean that resources invested in drugs with negligible therapeutic
benefits also produce substantial social costs. 196
Of course, like all patents, pharmaceuticals that generate little therapeutic
value still create administrative costs for an expensive regulatory system that
approves and monitors them. Here, that includes both the costs of running the PTO
and the costs of running the FDA.197 In addition, because low value patents are still
valid, competitors will have to search for them to determine whether their own
inventions face litigation risk.198 And having discovered the existence of previously
granted patents, competitors will expend costs either licensing or designing around
those patents.199 These expenses increase the costs of R&D and, potentially, the
costs to consumers.200
Yet there are further costs beyond these. When firms are incentivized to
maximize private value rather than social value, they invest resources that could
have been otherwise better spent. 201 As we have noted, pharmaceutical firms can
obtain substantial profits by producing “me too” drugs that treat conditions that are
treated just as well by existing options.202 In a world of infinite R&D resources, we
would not be worried about firms investing in pharmaceutical innovations that only
produced modest improvements or that only treated tiny populations. But in reality,
firms face capital constraints on their R&D, 203 so more money spent pursuing low
social value drugs means that less money will be spent developing high social value
drugs.
Although “me too” drugs ostensibly inject some degree of competition into
the market and should decrease the prices of first in the market drugs, the evidence
for price reductions is mixed. 204 Pharmaceutical companies determine the price of
Paul Grootendorst, How Should We Support Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 9 EXPERT REV.
PHARMACOECONOMICS OUTCOMES RES. 313, 315–16 (2009).
197 The PTO’s annual appropriation is over $2 billion. Deepak Hegde, Funding and Performance at
the US Patent and Trademark Office, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 148, 149 (2012). The FDA spends about
$2 billion of its annual budget on human drugs. Food & Drug Admin., Justification of Estimates for
Appropriations
Committees,
Fiscal
Year
2021,
73
(2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/135078/download
198 Clarisa Long, Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 469 (2004).
199 Bechtold, Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 19.
200 Id.
201 Masur, supra note 47, at 687.
202 Stephane Régnier, What Is the Value Of ‘Me-Too’ Drugs?, 16 HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE 300, 312 (2013); Wineinger, Zhang & Topol, supra note77, at 7.
203 Carmelo Giaccotto, Rexford E. Santerre & John A. Vernon, Drug Prices and Research and
Development Investment Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 J. L. & ECON. 195 (2005).
204 Hollis, supra note 69, at 7 (“However, since me-too drugs do not typically result in large price
reductions, it is likely that they attract more investment than is socially optimal.”); Wineinger, Zhang
196
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their drug at market entrance according to when they anticipate branded
competitors will enter the market, and they may lower prices over time to stay
competitive.205 Additionally, the entry of more branded competitors into the market
seems to result in slowed price increases over time.206 However, Wineiger and
colleagues’ recent analysis of trends in drug prices between 2012 and 2017
indicates that price increases are nearly universal, but the highest increases were
between branded drugs and their “me too” variants. 207 Some evidence suggests that
even the introduction of a generic competitor to a previously patented drug has little
effect on the total consumption of the medication.208 Although “me too” drugs may
not substantially reduce the prices of blockbuster drugs, they do, nonetheless, take
market share.209 This means that the competition created by “me too” drugs may
fail to benefit consumers through lower prices while simultaneously reducing
returns to the pioneer drugs that made significant innovations. 210

III.

CREATING INCENTIVES FOR WELFARE-ENHANCING DRUGS

The central objective of our paper is to bridge the divide we have described
in the preceding Parts between market outcomes and welfare—that is, between
drugs that will earn substantial amounts of money and drugs that will substantially
improve welfare. In this Part, we propose a series of patent law mechanisms aimed
at encouraging pharmaceutical firms to invest resources in developing drugs that
enhance welfare. Simultaneously, we hope to discourage firms from investing in
developing drugs that have only a limited effect on welfare, including “me too”
drugs that largely duplicate existing drugs that are already on the market. 211
A. Extending Patents for Beneficial Pharmaceuticals
& Topol, supra note 77, at 5 (“This finding suggests that prices of brand-name drugs are not largely
affected by the presence of generic drugs or perhaps biosimilar products and others that may enter
the market in the future.”).
205 Régnier, supra note 202, at 307–308; Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of
Follow-on Drug Research and Development, 22 PHARMACOECONOMICS, Supp. 2, 1 (2004).
206 Z. John Lu & William S. Comanor, Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals, 80 REV. ECON.
STAT. 108, 116 (1998) (“More numerous rivals have the expected effect of slowing price
increases.”).
207 Wineinger, Zhang & Topol, supra note 77, at 6.
208 Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An Analysis
of Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J. L. & ECON. 151, 153–54 (2012).
209 Régnier, supra note 202, at 305 (“The ‘average’ me-too drug was launched 2.5 years (10 quarters)
after the first entrant …. and captured 38.5% of market share.”).
210 Hollis, supra note 69, at 6 (“Not only is the R&D investment into “me-too” drugs likely
excessive, me-too products harm the returns available to pioneer drugs by capturing market share
from them even before patent expiry. This harms the incentive to undertake research into pioneer
drugs, to the extent that the innovator expects a reduction in its period of exclusivity.”).
211 Gagne & Choudhry, supra note 86, at 711 (describing the relative uselessness of “me too”
drugs).
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By way of example, consider a firm that is deciding whether to invest in
two drugs, Drug A and Drug B. Drug A is a typical “me too” drug—it treats a
condition (high cholesterol) for which there are already very good drugs on the
market, and it does so only slightly more effectively than existing treatments. 212
But the market for drugs that treat this condition is enormous, and if Drug A can
capture only part of that market it could be highly profitable. By contrast, Drug B
treats a disease that disproportionately afflicts poorer people in the United States
and Europe who face greater exposure to environmental toxins than do people
living in wealthier communities.213 Because the existing treatments are limited and
produce serious side effects, the introduction of Drug B would have a significant
effect on overall welfare. But the drug might not turn out to be especially
profitable.214 Most of the people who would want to take the drug are poor, and so
their capacity to purchase the drug would depend on their access to health insurance
and the reimbursement rates of Medicaid. 215 From a social welfare perspective, we
would much prefer that the firm invest in developing Drug B. But the firm, thinking
only of its own bottom line, is quite likely to select the more profitable Drug A
instead. What is needed, then, is some legal mechanism that would create additional
incentives for the firm to pursue Drug B (or dampen its incentives to pursue Drug
A).
Our principal lever is the patent term. We propose extending the patent term
for patents that are producing substantial welfare gains. Patents are valid for twenty
years from the date on which an application is filed. 216 But pharmaceutical drugs
typically do not reach the market until many years after the filing of a patent
application because of the need to run clinical trials and secure FDA approval. 217
This means that the typical period of market exclusivity is only ten to fourteen
years.218

Cf. Cholesterol Count: 4 Natural Statins, https://www.healthline.com/health/highcholesterol/natural-statins (describing the many statins available to treat high cholesterol).
213 Beverly Wright, Living and Dying in Louisiana’s “Cancer Alley,” in THE QUEST FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 88-93 (Robert D.
Bullard, ed., 2005) (explaining how pollution tends to be concentrated geographically, typically near
poorer communities and communities of color, due to land use decisions by policymakers).
212

214

215 Robert Capettini, David A. Dittman & Richard C. Morey, Reimbursement Rate Setting for
Medicaid Prescription Drugs Based on Relative Efficiencies, 4 J. ACCOUNTING & PUB. POL’Y 83,
86-91 (1985).
216 35 U.S.C. § 154.
217 Robin J. Strongin, Hatch-Waxman, Generics, and Patents: Balancing Prescription Drug
Innovation, Competition, and Affordability, National Health Policy Forum, at
https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_centers_nhpf/94 (2002).
218 Roin, supra note 40, at 511; Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 109-17 (2000) (suggesting that the typical effective
patent term is ten to twelve years); Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition
and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 492
(2007) (finding that the “maximum effective patent life” is typically fourteen years).
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Despite the relatively short patent term, the useful life of a pharmaceutical
can extend for decades (or even centuries).219 Contrast this with technologies such
as electronics, which are often obsolete after a few years.220 This means that when
a drug patent expires, the underlying drug is often still selling quite well and would
remain valuable to the firm producing it if the patent remained in force. 221
Extending the patent term would produce significant additional revenues to the firm
that owns the drug. Of course, the point is not to reward firms that have invented
drugs that are already in existence—once the drug has come into existence, no
further reward is necessary.222 Rather, the point is that the potential that a firm
might obtain these additional patent rewards should figure into the firm’s decision
about which drugs to pursue ex ante.223 The possibility of an extended patent term
should place a thumb on the scale in favor of drugs that will substantially enhance
welfare, thus increasing the number of such drugs that are produced and the rate at
which firms undertake those projects.
Our mechanism for creating such incentives is straightforward. Once a drug
patent reaches the sixteen-year mark, the patent’s owner may apply for an extension
of the patent term of up to five years. 224 We elected five years because it represents
a meaningful proportion of the typical ten-to-fourteen year effective life of a drug
patent.225 The PTO will grant or deny the extension on the basis of how much the
drug has improved welfare in the time it has been on the market. We propose scaling
term extensions to the number of QALYs that drugs generate over alternative
treatments. Drugs must increase overall welfare by at least 100,000 QALYs to
qualify for any term extension. We selected this number because it represents a very
John R. Alison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 452 (2003) (explaining that
pharmaceutical drugs often have a valuable market life that extends for many years after patenting).
220 Id. at 461 (contrasting drugs with electronic devices and other inventions, which often cease to
be useful or valuable relatively soon after patenting).
221 Id. at 455 (explaining the economics of the drug patent system).
222 Jonathan S. Masur & Adam R. Mortara, Patents, Property, and Prospectivity, 71 STAN. L. REV.
963, 978 (2019) (describing, in the context of purely prospective changes in the law, how the ex
ante perspective is what matters for creating patent incentives).
223 Id. (explaining how ex post changes can affect ex ante incentives).
224 The idea of increasing or decreasing the patent term in accordance with the welfare benefit of a
patented drug was developed separately and roughly contemporaneously with Neel U. Sukhatme &
M. Gregg Bloche, though that paper was published before the writing of this one was
completed. Sukhatme & Bloche, supra note 78. However, our paper differs from theirs in a number
of critical ways. Among them: we describe in detail how to measure the welfare effects of one drug
as compared with another follow-on drug, which is a central issue that Sukhatme and Bloche do not
address; we explain why policymakers should focus on a patent’s aggregate welfare effects, while
they seem to support per capita welfare effects; we advocate for the use of WBUs as the proper
measure of welfare; we propose a corresponding system by which patents will be invalidated or
weakened if they do not contribute substantially to welfare, making our mechanism two-sided, as
compared with the one-sided mechanism in Sukhatme and Bloche’s paper; and we describe in detail
how a system of patent term extensions (and limitations) would function and address potential
objections to it.
225 Roin, supra note 40, at 511. Of course, we are not wedded to this time period; policymakers
could certainly select a period of time that is shorter or longer.
219
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substantial increase in overall welfare, one that only a few drugs achieve. 226 In the
study by Chambers and colleagues that we described in the previous Part, only 14
of 102 drugs (13.7%) yielded predicted welfare gains of at least 100,000
QALYS.227 If the drug increases overall welfare by at least 600,000 QALYs, it
qualifies for a full five-year term extension. Again, this number is chosen to reward
only the very highest-performing drugs. In Chambers’ data, only a few drugs reach
this threshold.228 Welfare increases between 100,000 QALYs and 600,000 QALYs
will warrant proportionate term extensions of between 0 and 5 years. Thus, for
instance, if a drug increases welfare by 350,000 QALYs (halfway between 100,000
and 600,000 QALYS), it would qualify for a 2.5 year term extension. As we
described above, ideally these welfare improvements would be measured in WBUs,
which are the best proxy for actual changes in human welfare.229 But until there is
sufficient data to denominate drug effects in WBUs, we advocate using QALYs as
a second-best option.230
When measuring the welfare increase attributable to any particular drug,
our objective is to determine the counter-factual: How much has this drug increased
welfare, above and beyond what would have occurred if this drug had never been
invented or introduced? That is the proper baseline for determining how important
this drug was to overall welfare, and thus the proper baseline for measuring whether
this is the type of drug for which we wish to create additional incentives. As we
describe in greater detail below, accurately measuring a drug’s net effects requires
a correct understanding of the treatment options that both preceded and followed
it.231
We draw our inspiration for this mechanism in part from the Orphan Drug
Act.232 This law was designed to boost incentives for firms to develop
pharmaceutical drugs that treated relatively rare diseases and conditions. The
theory behind the Act is similar to the theory that underlies our paper: if a disease
is relatively rare, the market for a drug that treats the disease may be too small to
create the necessary incentives for a firm to develop that drug.233 Under the Orphan
Drug Act, a firm that patents a drug that treats a disease afflicting fewer than
200,000 people can apply for a seven-year extension of market exclusivity through
the FDA.234 In theory, this additional seven years of market exclusivity will provide
the necessary incentive to develop the drug in the first place. 235
Chambers et al., Estimating Population, supra note 169, at 230.
Id.
228 Id.
229 See supra notes 141-142.
230 See supra Part II (explaining the reasons to prefer WBUs over QALYs).
231 Infra Part III.B.
232 Pub. Law 97-414 (1983).
233 David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 125 (2000) (describing the intent and functioning of the Orphan Drug Act).
234 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a).
235 Rohde, supra note 233, at 129 (explaining the incentives the Orphan Drug Act was designed to
create).
226
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But the Orphan Drug Act is an imperfect fit for the goal of increasing human
welfare, and its mis-design highlights the advantages of our contrary approach. 236
The fact that a disease afflicts fewer than 200,000 people might be a reasonable
proxy for whether additional incentives will be necessary to induce a firm to
produce the drug.237 But it is not a good proxy for whether the drug will increase
welfare. If a disease afflicts fewer than 200,000 people, that is—if anything—an
indication that a drug that treats that disease may not have a substantial aggregate
effect on welfare. The very fact of the drug’s narrowness is reason to worry that
such a drug will not be as valuable as alternatives that the firm might pursue.
Moreover, the Orphan Drug Act does nothing to address the principal problem with
the market for pharmaceutical drugs, which we described above. 238 There are many
widespread disease and conditions that predominantly afflict poorer people who
cannot pay substantial amounts of money for expensive medications. 239 Drugs
addressing these sorts of conditions will be undersupplied by the market. But there
is no reason to believe that ability to pay for a drug will be correlated with whether
the drug affects 200,000 people or fewer. Accordingly, it appears that the Orphan
Drug Act is frequently used to extend the patent term of already-profitable drugs
that have only relatively small effects on welfare. 240 Needless to say, this is not how
a sensible law would be structured.241
We envision the PTO adjudicating whether a drug patent owner is entitled
to a patent term extension in a trial-type proceeding before a board at the Patent and
Trademark Office. The drug owner carries the burden of proof that the drug has in
fact increased welfare and must present evidence demonstrating this fact. At the
same time, other parties—competitors of the firm seeking the extension, the
government, or nongovernmental organizations—should be afforded the
opportunity to oppose the patent owner’s claim and present evidence contradicting
it. This proceeding will likely resemble Inter Partes Review, the administrative
procedure by which competitors and other parties can challenge a patent before a
panel of Patent Judges.242 In addition, a losing party would have the option of
appealing the PTO’s decision to the Federal Circuit, just as the losing party in an
Inter Partes Review can appeal. 243
It is important for the question of a term extension to be resolved in advance
of the point at which a patent expires, in order to avoid the inefficiency and
Id. at
Id. at 130.
238 See supra Part II.
239 TRACEY KIDDER, MOUNTAINS BEYOND MOUNTAINS, 126-27 (2004) (discussing the prominence
of TB and HIV in Haiti and other poor nations).
240 Jacquie Lee, Rare Disease Drugs Turning Huge Profits Catch Congress’ Eye, BLOOMBERG LAW
(Jan. 28, 2020) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/rare-disease-drugsturning-huge-profits-catch-congress-eye.
241 We take up this issue further in Part IV, infra.
242 The obvious difference is that in an Inter Partes Review proceeding, the party challenging the
patent bears the burden of persuasion, 37 C.F.R. § 42.20, whereas here the party seeking the patent
term extension would bear the burden of persuasion.
243 35 U.S.C. § 141.
236
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confusion that would result if a patent expired, generics entered the market, and
then the patent was reinstated. In particular, the process would ideally be complete
in time for a generic manufacturer to file for FDA approval in the event that the
PTO denies the patent term extension. 244 Accordingly, we propose measuring a
drug’s impact on welfare at the sixteen-year mark in part because the process of
application and decision regarding a term extension could be lengthy. The typical
Inter Partes Review proceeding takes approximately 18 months. 245 Inter Partes
Review cases that are appealed to the Federal Circuit usually take approximately
15 additional months to resolve. 246 Initiating the patent term extension decision at
the sixteen-year marks should mean that the decision will be resolved at least one
year in advance of the patent expiring. Meanwhile, the FDA has instituted plans to
approve generic drugs within eight to ten months.247 All told, then, it should be
possible to complete the process for deciding whether to extend the patent term
with enough time to spare for generic manufacturers to enter the marketplace by
the time the patent expires.
B.

The Choice of Baseline

As we noted above, the proper choice of baseline for measuring a drug’s
impact on welfare is critical. The objective is to accurately construct the
counterfactual question: How much did this particular drug increase human
welfare, compared with a world in which it never came into existence? If the
baseline is chosen incorrectly, it may lead the PTO to grant term extensions where
they are unwarranted or deny them where they would be appropriate.
We begin with the simplest case. Imagine a disease that kills 1000 people
annually. Firm A introduces a drug to treat this disease. Of the 1000 people who
contract the disease each year, 500 of them take the drug, and 300 of them have
their lives saved by the drug. The other 700 people do not experience any changes
in their lives before they die from the disease. The drug is on the market for 10
years when its patent reaches the sixteen-year mark, meaning that it saves the lives
of 3000 people. On average, the people whose lives are saved by the drug go on to
live an additional 40 years at an average QALY of 0.7. The welfare benefit of the
drug, measured against the baseline in which the drug does not exist, is given by
the following equation:

For a discussion of the approval process for generic drug entry, see Justina Molzon, The Generic
Drug Approval Process, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 275 (1995).
245 Ryan Kenny, Which Invalidity Avenue to Take: Inter Partes Review Verses Post-Grant Review,
IP WATCHDOG, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/31/which-invalidity-avenue-ipr-versespost-grant-review/id=99460. By way of comparison, it takes the PTO approximately two years to
grant the average patent. Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE L. J. 1701, 1712 (2016).
246 Kerry Taylor, Daniel Kamkar & Joel Broussard, IPR Appeals In 2017: The Pendency and Success
Rates, LAW360, January 16, 2018.
247 https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%e2%84%a2/news-articles/2016/9/gdufa-ii-fda-looks-tospeed-up-generic-drug-approval-process.
244
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Total welfare benefit = # people who benefit from having taken the drug × extra
years of life
preserved × welfare benefit per year of life
= 3000 people × 40 years/person × 0.7 QALYs
= 84,000 QALYs.
We would perform a similar calculation for a drug that improves lives rather
than saving them. For instance, imagine that this disease is not fatal, but it reduces
the well-being of any person afflicted with it by 0.25 QALYs for a period of five
years. The drug prevents this reduction in 300 of the 500 people who take it each
year (for each of ten years, meaning it successfully treats 3000 people). The overall
welfare benefit of the drug is given by the equation:
Total welfare benefit = # people who benefit from having taken the drug × welfare
loss avoided
per person per year × # of years of the disease would have
persisted
= 3000 people × 0.25 QALYs/person/year × 5 years
= 3750 QALYs.
If a drug combined both of these effects—preventing both mortality and
morbidity—the welfare effects of the reductions in mortality and morbidity would
obviously be combined.
Of course, it is rarely the case that a given disease can only be treated by
one drug, the drug in question. 248 Much more commonly there are two or more
drugs that can be used to treat a given disease, each of them with slightly varying
effects.249 Indeed, this issue of “me too” drugs—drugs that are introduced as
slightly different versions of existing medications—is one of the central animating
concerns of this Article. 250 In the typical “me too” drug scenario, a first drug is
developed and released that treats a significant condition. This drug produces large
revenues, which then induces subsequent drug manufacturers to produce similar
drugs—perhaps slightly superior but perhaps not—in an attempt to win some of the
market share away from the original producer. 251 In some cases, the second drug is
able to capture only a relatively small fraction of the first drug’s market share; in
other cases, it is able to capture almost all of the first drug’s market share. In
addition, the introduction of a second drug could lower the prices that both firms
charge for their various drugs; duopoly pricing is typically lower than monopoly

Hollis supra note 69, at 5.
Id.
250 Gagne & Niteesh, supra note 86, at 711.
251 Hollis, supra note 69, at 5; Gagne and Niteesh, supra note 86, at 711.
248
249
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pricing,252 although as we showed in Part II, the evidence for this effect is mixed.253
Nonetheless, competition can have the salutary effect of increasing the number of
people who are able to afford one of the two drugs.254
The question is how to judge the welfare impacts of Drugs 1 and 2, given
the fact that both of them exist and compete for the same market. First, consider
Drug 2. The proper baseline for judging Drug 2 is not a hypothetical world in which
Drug 1 does not exist. After all, Drug 1 did exist when Drug 2 was developed and
first hit the market. Drug 2 only deserves credit for the marginal welfare gains
produced by its introduction into the market, above and beyond the welfare gains
that Drug 1 was already producing.255 Drug 2 might generate some welfare gains
simply because it is better than Drug 1. In addition, Drug 2 might also generate
welfare gains because its introduction lowers the cost of both drugs and enables
more people to afford them. Put another way, if the introduction of Drug 2 causes
an additional person to be able to take either Drug 1 or Drug 2, then Drug 2 deserves
credit for that gain in welfare. But if the introduction of Drug 2 induces someone
to switch from Drug 1 to Drug 2, Drug 2 only deserves credit for the marginal gain
in welfare that the person receives from taking Drug 2 instead of Drug 1. This can
be expressed with the following equation:
welfare gain from Drug 2 = marginal welfare gain from patients who switched from
Drug 1
+ total welfare gain from new patients who start taking
Drug 2
+ total welfare gain from new patients who start taking
Drug 1
= (welfare gain from Drug 2 – welfare gain from Drug 1)
× # patients
who switched from Drug 1 to Drug 2
+ welfare gain from Drug 2 × # new patients taking Drug
2
+ welfare gain from Drug 1 × # new patients taking Drug
1
252 Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities, 54 REV. ECON.
STUD. 23, 26 (1987) (showing that pricing will generally be lower and quantity will be greater under
a duopoly than a monopoly).
253 See supra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
254 Gagne and Niteesh, supra note 86, at 711.
255 This is one of the limitations of the data produced by Chambers and colleagues that was discussed
in Part II. They had to rely on existing studies that compared pharmaceuticals to alternative
treatments. Often, several drugs that came out over a period of years were compared to the same
baseline treatment rather than to the drugs that had reestablished the new baseline. Chambers et al.,
Estimating Population, supra note 169, at 230.
We anticipate that the patent extension trials conducted by the PTO can improve this
process. The added time period may help with baseline comparisons, and firms and other
organizations should be incentivized to both produce and challenge data.
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= welfare gain for each patient taking Drug 2 × # patients
taking Drug 2
- (# patients taking Drug 1 before Drug 2 is introduced #patients
taking Drug 1 after Drug 2 is introduced) × welfare gain
for each
patient taking Drug 1
The first term on the right hand side of this equation is the total welfare gain of all
people taking Drug 2. The second term represents all of the people who have
switched away from Drug 1 as a result of the introduction of Drug 2. This second
term is subtracted from the first to represent the fact that Drug 2 deserves credit
only for the marginal gains to these individuals from the switch.
Consider a numerical example to illustrate our approach. Suppose that a
disease afflicts 1000 people and causes them to lose 0.2 QALYs annually. Drug 1
is introduced, 500 people begin taking Drug 1, and each of those people see an
increase in their welfare of 0.1 QALY each year. Subsequently, Drug 2 is
introduced. Drug 2 improves the welfare of someone afflicted with Disease by 0.2
QALYs, which is slightly better than Drug 1. Three hundred of the 500 people
taking Drug 1 switch to Drug 2. In addition, this forces both Drug 1 and Drug 2 to
lower their prices, such that 50 additional people start taking Drug 1 and 100
additional people start taking Drug 2. Now there are 400 people taking Drug 2 and
250 people taking Drug 1. In total, after the introduction of Drug 2, Drug 2 is
producing 80 QALYs in yearly welfare gains and Drug 1 is producing 25 QALYs
in welfare gains for a total of 105 QALYs in yearly welfare gains. However, the
welfare gain attributable to Drug 2 is only:
Drug 2 welfare gain = 400 people × 0.2 QALYs/person – (500 people – 250 people)
× 0.1
QALY/person
= 80 QALYs – 25 QALYs
= 55 QALYs.
Or, put another way, Drug 2 gets credit for 0.1 WBUs for each of the 300 people
who switched over (30 QALYs total), plus 0.2 WBUs for each of the 100 new
people who started taking Drug 2 (20 QALYs), plus 0.1 QALY for each of the 50
new people who started taking Drug 1 because of the introduction of Drug 2 (5
QALYs) for a total of 55 QALYs. Drug 1 is credited with the remaining 105
QALYs – 55 QALYs = 50 QALYs of welfare gain, which is the equivalent welfare
gain it was producing before Drug 2 was introduced.
The upshot is that with the appropriate choice of baseline, truly
groundbreaking drugs that yield substantial welfare gains are awarded greater credit
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toward patent extensions, while “me too” drugs that yield only marginal gains are
awarded less credit. Here, Drug 2—the better drug—is able to capture much of the
market and is thus producing greater welfare gains than Drug 1. But the fact remains
that Drug 2 is only a minor improvement on Drug 1, and it was the original
introduction of Drug 1 that generated the greatest welfare gains. Accordingly, Drug
1 receives greater credit toward a patent term extension. It is socially beneficial for
pharmaceutical firms to spend more resources pursuing drugs like Drug 1 and fewer
resources pursuing drugs like Drug 2.
This type of calculation can be repeated recursively for any number of drugs
that treat the same condition. The principle underlying it remains consistent: the
greatest rewards should go to the patented drugs that make the greatest impact on
welfare, measured against the status quo ante before the drug was developed.
Following a successful drug with a slightly more effective treatment for the same
condition is precisely the sort of behavior, exploiting the market structure of
pharmaceutical drugs, that we hope to disincentivize.
C.

Futility Patents

We have thus far been describing the incentive mechanisms we envision
being deployed to spur creation of welfare enhancing drugs and medical treatments.
But there is no reason that this mechanism need be one-sided. That is, we can do
more to spur welfare enhancing drugs than increasing patent incentives for
successful drugs. We can also create disincentives for firms to produce and patent
drugs or treatments that have small or negative effects on overall welfare—“me
too” drugs and the other sorts of treatments we described in Part II. Here, too, a
drug’s effect on welfare would be measured against the baseline that would have
existed if the drug had never been created. Thus, follow-on innovations that
represent only mild improvements over pre-existing drugs and treatments (but
subsume significant market share) would be understood to have produced only
meager welfare gains.256
In parallel to the process we described for extending a patent term, we
propose that any party be permitted to initiate a proceeding in the PTO to have a
patent adjudged as a “futility patent” as early as the patent’s twelfth year of
existence. At this proceeding, all interested parties—competitors, insurance
companies, or public interest organizations—could present evidence as to the
patent’s negative or relatively small impact on overall welfare, and the patent owner
could present contrary evidence. We expect that this process and any accompanying
appeal to the Federal Circuit would take no more than three years to complete. If
the patent were challenged in its twelfth year and classified as “futile,” whatever
disadvantages might apply to it would begin no later than the patent’s fifteenth year.
The reason for beginning the process this early is that penalties for futile patents
will only be successful and only worth pursuing if they arise substantially before
the end of the effective patent term.
256

Chambers et al., Specialty Drugs, supra note 162, at 1755.
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The penalty for a futility patent should vary depending on whether the
patent has a small beneficial effect on overall welfare or whether it creates zero or
negative welfare. With regard to patents that generate zero or negative welfare
effects—patents that are no better, or even worse, than what preceded them—we
recommend putting teeth in the patent law’s utility requirement. 257 As we explained
in Part I, the requirement that a patent be “useful” has heretofore been interpreted
to impose only a very minimal barrier to patenting. 258 It weeds out inventions for
which there is no known use, but little more than that. 259 But there is no reason that
it should be so limited, and there are (as we have explained) good reasons to
eliminate and discourage patents that make no meaningful welfare contribution.
Accordingly, we propose that Congress enact a law instructing the PTO to
invalidate any patent that has produced zero or negative social welfare by the time
it is challenged in a “futility” hearing. This would give real meaning to the patent
law’s ostensible requirement that patents be useful. And it would dramatically
diminish the incentives for firms to invent drugs that merely duplicate, or are even
inferior to, the drugs that preceded them. Where the market for pharmaceuticals
creates distortions, patent law can help to smooth them out.
For patents on drugs that are creating only small gains to welfare, we would
not recommend as drastic a remedy as cancellation. Instead, we would ideally
apply a penalty that is symmetric to the enhanced rewards described above for
welfare-enhancing drugs: the patent terms of those drugs should be reduced when
the drug falls short of a pre-determined welfare threshold. Unfortunately, however,
there is a complication that makes administering a penalty of that type effectively
impossible. Congress can increase patent terms by statute, and it has already done
so a number of times,260 but it cannot reduce patent terms below twenty years
without running afoul of the United States’ commitments under The Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 261 TRIPS
establishes various floors for intellectual property rights among signatory countries,
and one of those floors is a minimum term of twenty years for utility patents. 262 A
mechanism to disincentivize the creation of these types of drugs must therefore rely
on other policy levers.263
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Risch, Surprisingly Useful, supra note 52, at 156.
259 See supra Part I.
260 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. Law 97-414 (1983); Hatch-Waxman Act, Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. Law 98-417 (1984).
261 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Article 33 (“The term of protection available
shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.”).
262 Id. Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 151, 152 n. 6 (1999)
(discussing the TRIPS requirement of twenty years of patent protection).
263 In addition, although patent owners will generally have sufficient incentives to generate data
about the effectiveness of their products, other parties may not. Kapczynski, supra note 44, at 2365.
The costs of obtaining well-being data are higher for other parties than they are for patent owners,
and the benefits that can be obtained from those data will be spread among many parties,
undermining their potential value to any particular party. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 5, at 1927.
This may reduce the rate at which competitors decide to challenge existing patents as futile, because
257
258

36
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565320

Drugs, Patents, and Well-Being
Despite this hurdle, there are a wide variety of penalty options for
policymakers to choose from. Even without directly invalidating less worthwhile
patents or reducing their terms, Congress or the PTO could, by statute or rule,
weaken these types of patents and encourage challenges to them—thus reducing
their overall value—in a number of ways. Perhaps most obviously, the fact that a
patent produces negligible or negative welfare benefits should make it ineligible
for a term extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act264 or the Orphan Drug Act.265
Hatch-Waxman extensions compensate patent holders for the time that their drugs
spend in FDA clinical trials, lengthening their formal patent terms in order to
produce effective exclusivity periods that are closer to twenty years. 266 Although
FDA review can help establish whether the pharmaceutical is minimally safe and
effective, as we explained above, FDA approval is poorly correlated with actual
welfare benefits.267 By the time the patent holder applies for a Hatch-Waxman
extension, however, it is possible to know how well the drug actually works. If the
answer is “not very well,” there is no reason to provide an extension. The same is
true for drugs that receive extensions under the Orphan Drug Act. By definition,
drugs that are eligible for this extension treat small populations, so they are less
likely, all else equal, to generate significant aggregate welfare benefits. 268 And as
scholars have shown, pharmaceutical companies may be manipulating the law to
receive added protection for blockbuster high-profit drugs.269 Term extensions in
such cases are unwarranted.
Additional policy levers abound. Congress could pass a law removing the
presumption of validity from futility patents.270 This would allow any party
challenging the patent in court to prove that the patent is invalid only by a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than by the higher “clear and convincing
evidence” standard.271 The PTO could waive the Inter Partes Review filing fee,
which currently stands at $15,500, for challenges to futility patents.272 This would
make it less expensive for any third party to challenge the patent before the PTO
to do so would mean that a firm would effectively be producing a public good. It is for this reason
that we suggest that the government and public interest groups be permitted to bring similar
challenges.
264 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. Law 98-417 (1984). This law,
colloquially known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, permits patent owners to apply for patent term
extensions when the FDA took a longer time to approve the underlying drug.
265 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. Law 97-414 (1983).
266 See Brian P. Wallenfelt, Hatch-Waxman and Medical Devices, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1407,
1418 (2014); see also, Erika Lietzan, The History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 53, 55 (2018).
267 See supra Part II.B.
268 See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual
Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1384-85 (2011).
269 Rebecca Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 717, 726
(2005) (citing Taxol and AZT as blockbuster drugs approved under the Orphan Drug Act).
270 35 U.S.C. § 282.
271 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91 (2011) (setting forth the “clear and convincing”
standard).
272 37 C.F.R. 42.15(a).
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and have it judged invalid. Congress (or the courts) could also declare that any case
in which the owner of such a patent loses is per se an “exceptional case” for
purposes of attorneys’ fee-shifting.273 That would place the owner of such a patent
on notice that if it asserted the patent and lost, it would necessarily have to pay the
attorneys’ fees of the party it had sued. In turn, patent owners would be much less
willing to threaten dubious lawsuits, including nuisance suits, for fear that they will
lose and end up holding the bag. 274 Congress could also eliminate the possibility of
receiving treble damages for willful infringement in a suit based on such a patent,275
or even eliminate the possibility of asking for reasonable royalty damages and force
the patent-owner to prove that it has lost profits. 276 This is a small sampling of the
potential options, and one that largely focuses on the monetary costs and benefits
of asserting a patent; one could imagine a wide variety of other approaches as
well.277
We will illustrate the functioning of this mechanism with an example.
Suppose that Pharma Firm creates Drug B, a “me too” drug that largely duplicates
the effect of existing medication. (The existing medication might even be one of
Pharma Firm’s previous drugs.) The Coalition for Affordable Prescription Drugs
(“CAPD”)278 observes the limited effect of Drug B and initiates a “futility”
proceeding against it before the PTO. CAPD, aided by data provided by insurance
companies and the FDA, succeeds in proving to the PTO that Drug B is futile—it
has at best a very marginal effect on welfare. Pharma Firm appeals to the Federal
Circuit, which affirms the PTO’s decision. Just as the patent on Drug B is entering
its sixteenth year, then, all of the penalties of futility attach to Drug B. Pharma Firm
cannot apply for an extension of its period of exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman
Act279 or the Orphan Drug Act. 280 In addition, if Pharma Firm sues any party for
infringing its patent on Drug B, the patent will not be presumed valid in litigation.
And if Pharma Firm loses the infringement litigation, it will have to pay the

35 U.S.C. § 285; Octane Fitness LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637
(2012) (describing how loser-pays systems can deter weaker patent cases by raising the costs to the
losing party that asserts a weak patent).
275 35 U.S.C. § 284.
276 Id.; see generally Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 655 (2009) (explaining the differences between these two theories of
damages, the advantages and disadvantages of each, and the manner in which plaintiffs might try to
prove their theories of damages).
277 For instance, Congress could directly adjust the legal standards that apply to such patents. It
could weaken the threshold for finding such a patent anticipated or obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 102
& 103, or it could heighten the enablement or written description requirements for these types of
patents under 35 U.S.C. § 112. These tools would require careful crafting, and they are not as
straightforward to implement as the presumption- and fee-shifting approaches described above. The
point is merely to illustrate the range of options available to policymakers.
278 https://www.affordableprescriptiondrugs.org/
279 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. Law 98-417 (1984).
280 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. Law 97-414 (1983).
273
274
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attorneys’ fees stemming from the litigation. 281 This, in turn, will invite generic
manufacturers to enter the marketplace and challenge Drug B. Those challenges
will be both easier to win and cheaper for the challengers. All of this will make
Drug B substantially less valuable to Pharma Firm and, we hope, convince Pharma
Firm and its similarly situated competitors not to pursue such drugs in the future.
To be clear, our goal is explicitly not to punish pharmaceutical companies
for drug innovations that turn out not to work well. Instead, our objective is to
minimize the expected returns, either from the market or from litigation, to low or
negative welfare patent holders. This, in turn, will alter the incentive structure for
pursuing different sorts of treatments. Because firms will know that their “me too”
drugs may not receive term extensions, they will have less reason to invest in
developing them and should instead invest in innovations with more promising
welfare benefits. The mechanisms we describe here would not decimate a patent’s
value; even if some number of encumbrances were attached, the patent would still
retain value if used properly. But since the effective exclusivity period for
pharmaceutical patents is already well below twenty years, 282 reductions in the
value of the last five years of the patent term should substantially reduce the
incentives for firms to pursue these types of patents in the first place.
D.

Harnessing the Power of Markets

We are certainly not the first scholars to propose mechanisms for solving
the problems with the pharmaceutical industry’s incentives.283 And we do not mean
to suggest that any of these other solutions is inferior to ours. Nonetheless, we wish
to point out several strengths that our proposed amendments to patent duration have
over other options. In particular, our proposal harnesses the power of markets to
help discipline pharmaceutical companies.
In a number of European countries, the governmental body that is
equivalent to the FDA decides whether to approve a drug, in part, based on its
assessment of whether the drug is cost-effective. These countries consider the
estimated number of QALYs that a treatment will create relative to the treatment’s
cost.284 Only if the treatment meets a certain threshold (e.g. no more than
€50,000/QALY) will it be approved. Although systems like these have much to
recommend them, we think they fall short in a number of ways. First, they tend to
See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (providing for payment of attorneys’ fees by the losing party in in exceptional
cases).
282 Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 218, at 103-105 (2000) (finding that the effective exclusivity
period for pharmaceutical drugs is less than 20 years, and more like 10-15 years in most cases).
283 AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES
ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL (2008); Carl Nathan, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation with Medical Need,
13 NATURE MED. 304 (2007); Grootendorst, supra note 214, at 316-17; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette &
Q. Claire Xue, Innovation Policy and the Market for Vaccines (working paper 2020); Sukhatme &
Bloche, supra note 78, at 976.
284 Li Huang, Paul Frijters, Kim Dalziel & Philip Clarke, Life Satisfaction, QALYs, and the Monetary
Value of Health, 211 SOC. SCI. & MED. 131 (2018)
281
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ignore aggregate welfare in favor of welfare per person. Accordingly, a medicine
that is hugely successful at treating a disease for a small population might be
approved, but one that makes a smaller improvement for a large population might
not be. Second, by restricting access to the market for some treatments, they
eliminate the salutary effects of price competition. With fewer drugs approved to
treat a condition, those that make the cut could reap even greater profits. 285
Rather than having the FDA make robust cost-effectiveness decisions early
in a drug’s lifetime, our proposal allows the PTO to determine the strength of patent
law’s incentives after it has been on the market for a while. And because our
proposal is based on aggregate welfare rather than per-person welfare,
pharmaceutical companies will be motivated to increase the number of people
taking their drugs. One way they can do this is to reduce prices.
Return to the scenario above where Drug 1 creates a substantial
improvement in treatment outcomes relative to the status quo but is quickly
followed by Drug 2 which yields slightly better results. Under the current regime,
the duopoly may reach an equilibrium in which both drugs charge high prices,
splitting the market in half.286 Neither one wants to start a price war, especially if
the pharmaceutical firms may also be competing with each other on other drugs.
Under our approach, however, either firm could obtain a substantial increase in its
patent term—and, thus, its potential profit—by dropping its price to capture a
greater share of the market.
Importantly, our proposal does not just influence the ex ante incentives that
pharmaceutical firms have to produce high value drugs, it also influences their
behavior once their drugs enter the market. Should a firm find itself in a position
where it has created a “me too” drug unintentionally, it won’t be barred from the
market. And more importantly, it will have stronger incentives to reduce the drug’s
price either to qualify for a patent term extension 287 or to stave off challenges and
penalties.288
Finally, our proposal gives the manufacturer additional incentives to obtain
FDA approval for new uses of existing therapies. 289 Although the FDA approves
drugs for marketing based on their treatment of particular diseases, physicians can
prescribe the drugs for so-called “off label” uses.290 For example, although
clonidine is approved only for treatment of hypertension, it is often prescribed for
people suffering from ADHD, cancer pain, nicotine dependence, and restless leg

Note that many European countries have other mechanisms in place to control the prices that
pharmaceutical companies can charge. Absent those controls in the US, we could see even higher
prices if the FDA restricted approvals.
286 See Wineinger, Zhang & Topol, supra note 77, at 6 (noting the high correlation between the
prices of competitor drugs).
287 See supra Part III.A.
288 See supra Part III.C.
289 Eisenberg, supra note 269, at 717.
290 Dominique Leveque, Off-Label Use of Anticancer Drugs, 9 LANCET: ONCOLOGY 1102 (2008).
285
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syndrome.291 While some of off-label uses are supported by scientific data, most
lack evidence of therapeutic value. 292 The FDA does not have the authority to
prevent this practice, and manufacturers may secretly encourage off-label uses of
their drugs.293 But firms have little reason to seek formal FDA approval for new
indications of their drugs, because doing so is expensive and could reveal damaging
information about the drug’s effects. 294 Our proposal could address this concern by
only counting the welfare benefits that arise from FDA-approved uses. If a firm
wants credit for treating other disorders for purposes of obtaining a patent term
extension, it would need to seek FDA approval for them. In order to do so, it would
need to conduct new clinical trials and generate new valuable data about safety and
effectiveness.
*

*

*

We have proposed the outline of a new system for properly calibrating
patent law’s incentives to a drug’s therapeutic value. Although much remains to be
filled in, our proposal, along with the data that we cite in Part II, offers a proof of
concept that scholars and policymakers can begin to use. Our proposal includes
both carrots and sticks to influence pharmaceutical companies’ innovative behavior
when they are setting R&D priorities. Moreover, those incentives carry over to the
time when drugs are being marketed in ways that can have salutary effects on prices
and on data.

IV.

OBJECTIONS AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

We anticipate that our proposal will meet with objections from some
scholars. In this Part, we address some of the potential objections we anticipate. We
also offer some further considerations about the future of medical technology.
A.

Additional Rewards for Successful Drugs?

We suspect that some scholars will be concerned that our proposal would
lead to additional rewards from drugs that are already successful on the market—
drugs for which no additional reward is necessary.295 In some cases, this is indeed
10 Surprising Off-Label Uses for Prescription Drugs, PHARMACY TIMES, Jan. 5, 2016, at
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/timothy-o-shea/2016/01/10-surprising-off-labeluses-for-prescription-medications.
292 David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-Label Prescribing Among
Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006).
293 Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 269, at 733.
294 Id. at 725.
295 Richard Posner, Pharmaceutical Patents—Posner, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Dec. 12, 2004),
https://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2004/12/pharmaceutical-patents--posner.html (“The entire
patent prize goes to the firm that crosses the finish line first, and so a firm might spend a huge
291
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what would occur. If a firm invents a drug that treats a very serious condition—
meaning that it has a significant effect on welfare—that afflicts a large number of
people, and it is able to sell the drug at a meaningful price, the drug will be both
commercially successful and will qualify for a patent term extension under our
framework.
Nonetheless, we believe that we should be willing to tolerate this
possibility. The reason is that, in a world of finite drug development investment,
the question is not merely whether a particular drug is profitable or not; the question
is how the profitability of one drug compares to the profitability of the foregone
alternatives.296 Our animating concern is that a firm might elect to pursue a highly
profitable drug that targets only a small number of wealthy individuals 297 instead
of a slightly less profitable drug that would target a broader number of less wealthy
individuals but produce greater welfare gains. 298 Under these circumstances, a
potential patent term extension for the broader—but still profitable—drug
constitutes a feature of the system, not a bug. Our goal is to increase the likelihood
that firms will choose that drug over the alternative.
In addition, our mechanism is self-regulating when it comes to the price and
availability of a drug. Suppose a pharmaceutical firm invents a new blockbuster
drug that is very successful in treating a serious disease. If the firm raises the price
of that drug significantly, such that only the wealthiest patients can afford the drug,
that will affect the drug’s overall impact on welfare. Even if the drug is saving or
dramatically improving the lives of the people who take it, it will not have a great
impact on overall welfare if only a few people can afford it. This is part of the
reason why we propose basing patent term extensions on a drug’s overall impact
on welfare, rather than (for instance) the welfare increase per person who takes the
drug.299 Using the overall welfare impact as the operative metric forces
pharmaceutical firms to price their drugs at a level that makes them accessible to
the patient population if they want to obtain a term extension. Accordingly, as we
explained above, our mechanism creates incentives not merely for drug
development but also for drug distribution and uptake. This is in contrast to the

amount of money to beat its nearest rival by one day even though the value to the public of having
the invention one day earlier might be negligible.”); see also, Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price
Be Evergreen, 5 J. L. & BIOSCI. 590 (2018).
295 Feldman, supra note 295, at 596-97.
296 Id. at 596-97.
297 See, Sarah Jane Tribble and Sydney Lupkin, Drugs for Rare Diseases Have Become Uncommonly
Rich Monopolies, NPR ONLINE (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/01/17/509506836/drugs-for-rare-diseases-have-become-uncommonly-richmonopolies; see also, Koichi Mikami, Orphans in the Market: The History of Orphan Drug Policy,
32 SOC. HIST. MED. 609, 628 (Aug. 2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/shm/hkx098/.
298 See, e.g., Zulfiqar Bhutta et al., Global Burden, Distribution, and Interventions for Infectious
Diseases of Poverty, 3 INFECTIOUS DISEASES OF POVERTY 21 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1186/20499957-3-21.
299 See supra Part III.D.

42
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565320

Drugs, Patents, and Well-Being
Orphan Drug Act, which can lead to term extensions even for drugs with incredibly
high prices that help relatively few people. 300
Two caveats are in order. First is the potential concern that a firm might
hold down the price of its drug until Year 18 in order to qualify for a patent term
extension, and then raise the price of the drug after the extension has been granted.
We believe that such a practice should be prohibited. As a condition of receiving a
patent term extension, the firm owning the patent should be required to aver that it
will price the drug no higher it was priced before the extension was granted. The
term extension should be revoked if the firm deviates from this agreement. Second,
we do not mean to imply that the mechanism we describe in this Article is firstbest, or that it is perfect and cannot be improved upon. One could imagine
superior—and more complicated—alternatives in which a drug would qualify for a
term extension if and only if it had sufficiently low profits, in addition to
sufficiently great welfare effects. We do not mean to disclaim the possibility or
value of such options.
Finally, what the law gives, it also takes away. Alongside additional rewards
for welfare-enhancing drugs, we proposed reductions in the effective term, power,
and value of patents that produce only negative or negligible therapeutic effects.
The overall effect on the patent system, then, is indeterminate. It is possible that
our mechanisms would make drug patents more powerful and valuable on the
whole; it is also possible that they would be weakened overall. The one thing we
can know for sure is that they would generate a split between highly welfareenhancing inventions and inventions that are disappointing from a welfare
perspective. The former would become more valuable and more attractive to firms
deciding on resource allocation; the latter would become less so. This is precisely
the arrangement that a welfarist policymaker should hope to generate. 301
B.

Longer-Term Declines in Welfare

A related possibility is that our proposal may be self-defeating. Extending
a drug’s patent term gives rise to precisely the same tradeoffs that are implicated
by any sort of patent term. On the one hand, the potential for an increased term can
spur firms to invest resources in inventing the drug in the first place. This is the
dynamic efficiency of patents.302 But on the other hand, increasing a patent’s term
will prevent generic drugs from entering the marketplace for that much longer,
keeping the price higher and potentially reducing the number of people who have
access to the drug. This is the deadweight loss created by patents—the static
inefficiency.303 The concern is that extending a welfare-enhancing drug’s patent
Jacquie Lee, Rare Disease Drugs Turning Huge Profits Catch Congress’ Eye, BLOOMBERG LAW,
Jan. 28, 2020.
301 See, e.g., Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 103 VA.
L. REV. 1809, 1812 (2017).
302 See supra notes 31-35.
303 See supra notes 36-48.
300
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term by five years may lead to foregone welfare—through the individuals who
cannot afford it during those five years—that exceeds the increase in welfare from
the additional patent incentives. This type of concern is present whenever a patent
is granted or, in this case, extended.
This is ultimately an empirical question—just as it is for the patent system
as a whole—and thus we cannot dismiss it. But there are at least two reasons for
optimism. First, as we described in Part II, firm incentives for drug development
are severely skewed by the marketplace, and there is ample evidence that firms are
not prioritizing the types of drugs that will lead to the greatest welfare gains. There
are thus strong reasons to believe that the effect of altering firm incentives—
offering longer patent terms for welfare-enhancing patents and weakening
disappointing patents—will have a significant effect. Our mechanism takes
advantage of thick margins. Even if the extended patent term means that some
people are unable to afford the drug for an additional five years, the value of these
additional incentives may swamp the static inefficiency.
The existing empirical evidence suggests that patent term alterations such
as the ones we propose could have significant effects on R&D allocations. For
example, Budish, Roin, and Williams studied firms’ decisions to invest in cancer
treatments based on the length of clinical trials for different sorts of treatments 304.
Potential treatments for late-stage cancer take less time in clinical trials than do
treatments for early-stage cancer, because the outcome variable (survival) occurs
more rapidly with late-stage cancer. This means that the effective patent term for
late-stage treatments is longer than for early-stage treatments, and thus the size of
patent incentive is larger for late-stage treatments.305 Consistent with expectations,
the authors find that firms invest significantly more resources in late-stage than in
early-stage cancer treatments, suggesting that they are responsive to changes in
effective patent duration.306 Thus, we anticipate meaningful dynamic effects from
enhanced R&D.
In addition, we expect that the static inefficiency from increasing a patent
term by five years will be relatively muted. The cost of prescription drugs has
recently become a significant political issue, 307 but it remains the case that most
Americans have health insurance plans that cover the cost of most prescription
drugs. Moreover, as we have explained, the mechanism we propose will be selfregulating along this dimension as well. In order for a drug to increase welfare
sufficiently to qualify for a term extension, it will almost necessarily need to be
accessible to a large number of people. In order for it to be accessible to that many
people, it will have to be priced reasonably or covered by most insurance plans. If
Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 27, at 5.
Id. at 8.
306 Id.
307 KFF, Poll: Nearly 1 in 4 Americans Taking Prescription Drugs Say It’s Difficult to Afford Their
Medicines, including Larger Shares Among Those with Health Issues, with Low Incomes and
Nearing Medicare Age, March 1, 2019, at https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/pollnearly-1-in-4-americans-taking-prescription-drugs-say-its-difficult-to-afford-medicines-includinglarger-shares-with-low-incomes/.
304
305
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access during the first 18 years of the patent term is relatively widespread, there is
no reason to believe that it would narrow significantly during any patent term
extension. Therefore, while we are sensitive to the possibility that the longer patent
term will deny some people access to the drug, and while such a possibility cannot
be ruled out, we suspect that the effect will be smaller than it would be for other
types of inventions or for drugs that did not meet the standard for an extension.
Of course, as we alluded to above, there is the residual possibility that a firm
will attempt to game the system by holding down the price through the eighteenth
year of the patent term in order to qualify for an extension and then raising it once
the extension has been granted. As we explained, we would explicitly prohibit this
pernicious practice as a condition of receiving a patent term extension.
C.

Welfare Measurement and Age

Finally, we can imagine an objection to our proposed mechanism as
favoring younger people—and drugs that will cure diseases that afflict them—over
older people. Any calculation of human welfare that incorporates duration as a
component, be it WBUs or QALYSs, will tend to place greater weight on a drug
that saves (that is, prolongs) the life of a younger person than a drug that saves
(prolongs) the life of an older person. The simple reason is that the younger person
has more life yet to live, and so a drug that prevents that person from dying of that
disease will yield greater increases in welfare. Allowing a ten-year-old to live an
additional seventy years is worth more, in welfare terms, than allowing a seventyyear-old to live an additional ten years.
This built-in preference may seem barbaric to some. It seems to fly in the
face of the deontological view that all lives have equal value. And economists
would undoubtedly point out that the elderly typically exhibit greater willingness
to pay for drugs and other medical treatments than the young.308 But we think this
preference is a natural consequence of adopting a welfarist approach, and we view
it as a feature, not a bug, of this system. 309 We should want firms to invest additional
resources in drugs and treatments that will save the young, people who could have
long, fruitful lives ahead of them. Indeed, the fact that the elderly exhibit greater
willingness to pay for drugs is part of the economic problem that motivates our
proposal. Their greater willingness to pay is almost certainly driven by their greater
ability to pay: the elderly have amassed more wealth than the young (and their
parents). Welfare, not wealth, should be the motivating criterion of the patent
system.
D. Measurement Challenges for Vaccines and Personalized Medicine

See e.g. Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Differences in the Value of Statistical Life:
Revealed Preference Evidence, 1 REV. ENVIR. ECON. & POL’Y 241 (2007).
309 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 1583 (2010)
308
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Finally, we address possible complications that might arise from attempts
to assess the welfare benefits of vaccines and personalized medicines. To this point,
our paradigm case has concerned a standard drug that comes in one form, provides
benefits only to the person who takes the drug, and improves the individual’s health
condition ex post. But not all pharmaceutical innovations follow this form. Most
obviously, vaccines are administered ex ante—before an individual has contracted
a disease—rather than ex post. They are preventions, not treatments. In addition,
vaccines often create positive externalities or produce dynamic effects. 310 Each
person who is vaccinated against a disease helps reduce the spread of that disease
to other people, lowering their risk as well. 311 In theory, then, measuring the welfare
effects of a given individual dose of a vaccine could be more complex than
measuring the welfare effects of a standard drug treatment. It might depend on how
many other people in the relevant population receive the vaccine, the risk factors of
the vaccinated individual, or any number of other factors.
This is not, however, an insurmountable hurdle. It is possible to estimate
the amount of well-being that is currently being lost from diseases that do not have
vaccines. For example, 5 million people die each year from tuberculosis, and many
more are made very sick from the disease. 312 If a firm introduces a vaccine that
reduces the incidence of the disease, it should be credited for the reductions in
mortality and morbity not just of those who receive the vaccine but also of those
who benefit from “herd immunity.”313 Researchers have compiled estimates of the
QALY benefits that accrue from a number of vaccines, including for HPV,314 Lyme

Martin Kremer, Creating Markets for New Vaccines, Part I: Rationale, NBER Working Paper
No. 7716, at https://www.nber.org/papers/w7716.
311 ERNST R. BERNDT, RENA N. DENONCOURT & ANJLI C. WARNER, U.S. MARKETS FOR VACCINES:
CHARACTERISTICS, CASE STUDIES, AND CONTROVERSIES 24-25 (2009); see also Ouellette & Xue,
supra note 283, at 22-23.
312 Kremer, supra note 310, at 36.
313 M. Brisson & W.J. Edmunds, Economic Evaluation of Vaccination Programs: The Impact of
Herd-Immunity, 23 MED. DECISION MAKING 76, 76 (2003) (“Mass vaccination not only reduces the
incidence of disease in those immunized but also indirectly protects nonvaccinated susceptibles
against infection. The concept of indirect protection of susceptibles (e.g., nonvaccinees) is termed
herd-immunity.”).
314 Sarah C. Woodhall et al., Cost of Treatment and QALYs Lost Due to Genital Warts: Data for the
Economic Evaluation of HPV Vaccines in the United Kingdom, 36 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DISEASES 515 (2009).
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disease,315 and rotavirus,316 among others.317 These numbers could be used for
determining the relative welfare benefits of patented vaccines.318
Personalized medicine raises a different set of concerns. Personalized
medicine involves treatments that are specially designed and targeted to the
individual patient, often involving small variations of a common treatment at the
molecular level.319 No two treatments (for two different individuals) are
identical.320 This means that in some cases it may not be obvious where one drug
ends and another begins—or, put another way, which outcomes to attribute to a
single drug or a single patent. Personalized medicine can give rise to tricky linedrawing problems where treatments are similar but not identical and multiple
patents overlap.321
Certainly it would be wrong to decrease incentives for the development of
personalized medicine merely because each separate treatment affects fewer people
than do traditional medicines. All else equal, we would rather a pharmaceutical
company develop one hundred medicines for one hundred separate people,
improving each one’s life by five QALYs than have it develop one medicine to
treat one hundred people, improving each one’s life by only three QALYs. 322 We
believe, however, that these issues could be resolved by the PTO. The connection
between treatments and patents—and the question of which treatments should
collectively fall under the heading of which patents—are the types of issues that
courts and the PTO should be able to sort through. To be sure, there will be litigation
over these line-drawing questions. But that type of litigation is inevitable any time
the law attempts to create classifications or sort different types of conduct. Despite
the fact that patent law is not facially technology-specific, it is well known by this
point that the law applies differently to different types of inventions.323 Our
approach will be no less straightforward or easily applied than what the courts have
Nancy A Shadick et al., The Cost-Effectiveness of Vaccination against Lyme Disease, 161 ARCH.
INTERNAL MED. 554 (2001).
316 Baudouin Standaert et al., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Vaccination Against Rotavirus with
RIX4414 in France, 6 APPLIED HEALTH ECON & HEALTH POL’Y 199 (2008).
317 For one example, see Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, Worms: Identifying Impacts on
Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities, 72 ECONOMETRICA 159 (2004)
(performing a welfare calculation on a type of preventative medicine).
318 See Berndt et al., supra note 311, at 32-34; Paul Fine, Ken Eames & David L. Keymann, “Herd
Immunity”: A Rough Guide, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 911, 915 (2011) (describing the
dynamics of herd immunity).
319 Margaret A Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized Medicine, 363 NEW
ENGLAND J. OF MED. 301, 302 (2010) (explaining and describing personalized medicine).
320 M. Whirl-Carrillo et al., Pharmacogenomics Knowledge for Personalized Medicine, 92 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 414, 415-16 (2012) (describing the ways in which different
treatments can vary among individuals).
321 See W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won't Hinder Whole Genome
Sequencing and Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601, 1625-26 (2011) (describing the
ways in which patents interact with personalized medicine).
322 We say “all else equal” because we would want to consider the relative R&D costs of these two
improvement as well as their benefits.
323 Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1578.
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already been doing, and the potential benefit to human welfare is, if anything, much
greater.
CONCLUSION
Advances in medical, social, and behavioral sciences have given
policymakers the tools to craft a patent regime that calibrates legal incentives with
an innovation’s effects on well-being. Failing to do so leads to underinvestment in
truly valuable drugs and overinvestment in less socially valuable drugs. Given the
enormous stakes for the US healthcare market, immediate changes to patent law are
vital. In this Article, we have provided a framework for policymakers to adapt
patent law to maximize well-being. Our proposals will certainly be resisted by some
stakeholders. But we hope that they will draw widespread support as a means of
lowering pharmaceutical costs while maintaining cutting-edge innovation.
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